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FOREWORD
  This monograph considers the changing fortunes of the 
Palestinian  movement,  HAMAS,  and  the  recent  outcomes 
of Israeli strategies aimed against this group and Palestinian 
nationalism  external  to  the  Fatah  faction  of  the  Palestinian 
Authority. The example of HAMAS challenges much of the 
current  wisdom  on  “insurgencies”  and  their  containment. 
As the author, Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, demonstrates, efforts have 
been made to separate HAMAS from its popular support and 
network of social and charitable organizations. These have not 
been effective in destroying the organization, nor in eradicating 
the will to resist among a fairly large segment of the Palestinian 
population. 
  It is important to consider this Islamist movement in the 
context of a region-wide phenomenon of similar movements 
with local goals, which can be persuaded to relinquish violence, 
or  which  could  move  in  the  opposite  direction,  becoming 
more violent. Certainly an orientation to HAMAS and its base 
must be factored into new and more practical and effective 
approaches to peacemaking. 
  At the same time, HAMAS offers a fascinating instance 
of the dynamics of strategic reactions, and the modification 
of Israeli impulses towards aggressive deterrence, as well as 
evolution in the Islamist movements’ planning and operations. 
As  well,  the  Palestinian-Israeli  conflict  bears  similarities  to 
a  long-standing  civil  conflict,  even  as  it  has  sparked  inter-
Palestinian hostilities in its most recent phase. 
  The  need  for  informed  and  critical  discussion  of  the 
future of Islamism in the region continues today. We offer 
this monograph to those who wish to consider this particular 
aspect of the Palestinian-Israeli-Arab conflict.
  
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute vi
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SUMMARY
  The conflict between Palestinians and Israelis has 
heightened since 2001, even as any perceived threat 
to Israel from Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, or even Syria, has 
declined. Israel, according to Chaim Herzog, Israel’s 
sixth President, had been “born in battle” and would 
be  “obliged  to  live  by  the  sword.”1  Yet,  the  Israeli 
government’s  conquest  and  occupation  of  the  West 
Bank and Gaza brought about a very difficult challenge, 
although resistance on a mass basis was only taken 
up years later in the First Intifadha. Israel could not 
tolerate Palestinian Arabs’ resistance of their authority 
on  the  legal  basis  of  denial  of  self-determination,2 
and eventually preferred to grant some measures of 
self-determination  while  continuing  to  consolidate 
control  of  the  Occupied  Territories,  the  West  Bank, 
East Jerusalem, and Gaza. However, a comprehensive 
peace,  shimmering  in  the  distance,  has  eluded  all. 
Inter-Israeli and inter-Palestinian divisions deepened 
as peace danced closer before retreating. 
  Israel’s stance towards the democratically-elected 
Palestinian government headed by HAMAS in 2006, 
and  towards  Palestinian  national  coherence—legal, 
territorial, political, and economic—has been a major 
obstacle to substantive peacemaking. The reasons for 
recalcitrant Israeli and HAMAS stances illustrate both 
continuities and changes in the dynamics of conflict 
since  the  Oslo  period  (roughly  1994  to  the  al-Aqsa 
Intifadha of 2000). Now, more than ever, a long-term 
truce and negotiations are necessary. These could lead 
in stages to that mirage-like peace, and a new type of 
security regime. 
  The rise in popularity and strength of the HAMAS 
(Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, or Movement of viii
the Islamic Resistance) Organization and its interaction 
with Israel is important to an understanding of Israel’s 
“Arab” policies and its approach to counterterrorism 
and counterinsurgency. The crisis brought about by 
the electoral success of HAMAS in 2006 also challenged 
Western powers’ commitment to democratic change in 
the Middle East because Palestinians had supported the 
organization in the polls. Thus, the viability of a two-
state solution rested on an Israeli acknowledgement 
of  the  Islamist  movement,  HAMAS,  and  on  Fatah’s 
ceding power to it. 
  Shifts in Israel’s stated national security objectives 
(and dissent over them) reveal HAMAS’ placement at 
the nexus of Israel’s domestic, Israeli-Palestinian, and 
regional objectives. Israel has treated certain enemies 
differently than others: Iran, Hizbullah, and Islamist 
Palestinians (whether HAMAS, supporters of Islamic 
Jihad, or the Islamic Movement inside Israel) all fall 
into a particular rubric in which Islamism—the most 
salient  and  enduring  socio-religious  movement  in 
the Middle East in the wake of Arab nationalism—is 
identified with terrorism and insurgency rather than 
with  group  politics  and  identity.  The  antipathy  to 
religious fervor was somewhat ironic in light of Israel’s 
own  expanding  “religious”  (haredim)  groups.  In 
Israel’s earlier decades, Islamic identity politics were 
understood and successfully repressed, as Israelis did 
not  want  to  allow  any  repetition  of  the  Palestinian 
Mufti’s  nationalism  or  the  Qassamiyya  (the  armed 
brigades in the 1936-39 rebellion). 
  Yet at the same time, identity politics and religious 
attitudes were not eradicated, but were inside of Israel, 
bringing  about  great  inequality  as  well  as  physical 
and psychological separation of the Jewish and non-
Jewish  populations.3  This  represented  efforts  to ix
control politically and physically the now 20 percent 
Arab  minority,  and  dealt  with  the  demographic 
threat constantly spoken of in Israel by warding off 
intermarriage,  limiting  property  control  and  rights, 
and physical access. Still today, some Israeli politicians 
call  for  an  exodus  by  Palestinian-Israelis  (so-called 
Arab-Israelis) in some areas, who they wish to resettle 
in the West Bank. 
  For  decades,  Muslim  religious  properties  and 
institutions were managed under Jewish supervision—
substantial inter-Israeli conflict over that supervision 
notwithstanding4—and this allowed for a continuing 
stereotype  of  the  recalcitrant,  anti-modern  Muslims 
and Arabs who were punished for any expression of 
Palestinian (or Arab) nationalism by replacing them—
imams  or  qadis,  for  instance—with  more  quiescent 
Israeli Muslims, and by retaining Jewish control over 
endowment (waqf), properties, and income.
  Contemporary Islamism took hold in Palestinian 
society, as it has throughout the Middle East and has, 
to  a  great  degree,  supplanted  secular  nationalism. 
This is problematic in terms of the conflict between 
Israel and the Palestinians because the official Israeli 
position towards key Islamists—Iran, Hizbullah, and 
the Palestinian groups like HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, or 
Hizb  al-Tahrir—characterizes  them  as  Israel-haters 
and terrorists. They have become the existential threat 
to Israel (along with Iran) since the demise of Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq. 
  Israel  steadfastly  rejected  diplomacy  and  truce 
offers by HAMAS for 8 months in 2008, despite an 
earlier truce that held for several years. By the spring 
of 2008, continued rejection of a truce was politically 
risky as Prime Minister Ehud Olmert teetered on the 
edge of indictment by his own party and finally had to x
announce his resignation in the summer. In fact, on his 
way out the door, Olmert announced a peace plan that 
ignores HAMAS and many demands of the Palestinian 
Authority as a whole ever since Oslo. If the plan was 
merely to create a sense of Olmert’s legacy, it is not 
altogether clear why it offered so little compromise. 
  On the other hand, Israelis have for over a year5 
been discussing the wisdom of reconquering the Gaza 
Strip (a prospect that would aid the Fatah side of the 
Palestinian Authority) and also engage in “preemptive 
deterrence” or attacks on other states in the region. This 
could happen at any time if the truce between Israel 
and HAMAS breaks down, although the risks of any 
of these enterprises would be high. A potential deal 
with Syria was also announced by Olmert, similarly, 
perhaps, to stave off his own resignation, and Syria 
made a counteroffer.6 Turkish-mediated indirect talks 
were to continue at the time of this writing, though they 
might be rescheduled.7 Support for an Israeli attack on 
Iran continues to play well in the Israeli media, despite 
the fact that Israelis argue fiercely about the wisdom of 
such a course. All of this shows flux in the region, with 
Israel in its customary strong, but concerned position.
  HAMAS emerged as the chief rival to the secularist-
nationalist framework of Fatah, the dominant member 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This 
occurred as Palestinians rebelled against the worsening 
conditions they experienced following the Oslo Peace 
Accords. HAMAS’ political and strategic development 
has been both ignored and misreported in Israeli and 
Western sources which villainize the group, much as 
the  PLO  was  once  characterized  as  an  anti-Semitic 
terrorist group.8 Relatively few detailed treatments in 
English counter the media blitz that reduces HAMAS 
to its early, now defunct, 1988 charter. xi
  Disagreements  within  the  Israeli  military  and 
political  establishments  over  the  national  security 
objectives of that country reveal HAMAS’ placement 
at  the  nexus  of  Israel’s  domestic,  Palestinian,  and 
regional objectives. This process can be traced back to 
Ariel Sharon’s formation of the KADIMA Party and 
decision to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza without 
engaging  in  a  peace  process  with  Palestinians.  This 
reflected a new understanding that Arab armies were 
unlikely to launch any successful attack against Israel, 
but Israel should focus instead on protecting its Jewish 
citizens via barrier methods.9 
  This  new  thinking  coexists  alongside  the  long-
standing  policies  described  by  Yitzhak  Shamir  as 
aggressive defense; in other words, offensives aimed 
at  increasing  Israel’s  strategic  depth,  or  attacking 
potential threats in neighboring countries—as in the 
raid on the nearly completed nuclear power facility 
at Osirak, Iraq, in 1981, or the mysterious Operation 
ORCHARD carried out on a weapons cache in Syria 
in September 2007, or in the invasions, air, and ground 
wars (1978, 1982, 2006) in Lebanon. 
  Israelis considered occupied Palestinian territories 
valuable  in  land-for-peace  negotiations.  During  the 
Oslo process, according to Israelis, Israel was ready to 
withdraw entirely to obtain peace.10 Actually, the value 
of  land  to  trade  for  peace  and  costs  of  maintaining 
security for the settlers there, as well as containing the 
uprisings,  were  complicated  equations.  Palestinians 
and others argue that, in fact, Israel offered no more in 
the various proposed exchanges than the less valuable 
portion  of  the  western  West  Bank  and  Gaza,  and 
refused to deal with outstanding issues such as the 
fate of Palestinian refugees (4,913,993 Palestinians live 
outside of Israel11 and the occupied territories; 1,337,388 
according to UNRWA12—registered refugees—live in xii
camps, and 3,166,781 live outside of camps),13 prisoners, 
water, and the claim of Jerusalem as a capital. 
  Many  Arabs  believe  that  Israel  never  intended 
the formation of a Palestinian state, and that its land-
settlement  policies  during  the  Oslo  period  provide   
proof of its true intentions. Either way, the “Oslo opti-
mism” faded away between Israelis and Palestinians 
with the al-Aqsa (Second) Intifadha in October 2000. 
  The Israeli Right, and part of its Left, claimed that 
the  diplomatic  collapse,  plus  Arafat’s  government’s 
corruption, showed there was no “partner to peace.” 
Another segment of the Israeli Left has continued until 
this  day  to  argue  for  land-for-peace  and  complete 
withdrawal from the territories. 
  According to Barry Rubin, the Israeli military felt 
the  Palestinian  threat  would  not  increase,  and  that 
if  settlers  could  be  evacuated  and  a  stronger  line 
of  defense  erected,  they  might  better  defend  their 
citizenry.  That  defense  could  not  be  achieved  with 
suicide attacks ongoing in Israeli population centers. 
When  earlier  Israeli  strategies  had  not  achieved  an 
end  to  Palestinian  Islamist  violence,  Israelis  had 
pushed this task onto the Fatah-dominated Palestinian 
Authority  in  the  1990s.14  Pointing  to  the  failures  of 
the Palestinian Authority, the new Israeli “securitist” 
(bitchonist,  in  Hebrew,  or  security-focused)  strategy 
moved away from negotiations, and called for further 
separation and segregation of the Israeli population 
from  Palestinians.  Neither  a  full-blown  physical 
resistance  by  Palestinians,  including  suicide  attacks, 
or  the  missiles  launched  from  Gaza  could  be  dealt 
with in this manner. The first depended on granting 
Palestinians rights to partial self-government, and the 
missile attacks were negotiated in Israel’s June 2008 
truce.xiii
  Israel claimed significant victories in its war against 
Palestinians by the use of targeted killings of leadership, 
boycotts, power cuts, preemptive attacks and detentions, 
and punishments to militant’s families, relatives, and 
neighborhoods etc., because its counterterrorism logic 
is to reduce insurgents’ organizational capability. This 
particular type of Israeli analysis rejects the idea that 
counterterrorist  violence  can  spark  more  resistance 
and violence,15 but one proponent also admitted that 
Israel  had  not  “defeated  the  will  to  resistance”  [of 
Palestinians].16 This admission suggests that the tactics 
employed might not be indefinitely manageable, and 
that Palestinians, despite every possible effort made to 
weaken or incriminate them, to discourage or prevent 
their Arab non-Palestinian supporters from defending 
their interests, and to buy the services of collaborators, 
could  edge  Israelis  back  toward  comprehensive 
negotiations,  or  rise  up  again  against  them.  Moshe 
Sharett,  Israel’s  second  Prime  Minister,  once  asked: 
“Do  people  consider  that  when  military  reactions 
outstrip in their severity the events that caused them, 
grave  processes  are  set  in  motion  which  widen  the 
gulf and thrust our neighbors into the extremist camp? 
How can this deterioration be halted?”17 
  HAMAS  and  its  new  wave  of  political  thought, 
which had supported armed resistance along with the 
aim to create an Islamic society, had overtaken Fatah in 
popularity. Fatah, with substantial U.S. support edged 
closer to Israeli positions over 2006-07, promising to 
diminish  Palestinian  resistance,  although  President 
Mahmud Abbas had no means to do so, and could not 
even ensure Fatah’s survival in the West Bank without 
HAMAS assent, and had been routed from Gaza. 
  Negotiating  solely  with  the  weaker  Palestinian 
party—Fatah—cannot  deliver  the  security  Israel xiv
requires. This may lead Israel to reconquer the Gaza 
Strip  or  the  West  Bank  and  continue  engaging  in 
“preemptive deterrence” or attacks on other states in 
the region in the longer term. 
  The  underlying  strategies  of  Israel  and  HAMAS 
appear mutually exclusive and did not, prior to the 
summer  of  2008,  offer  much  hope  of  a  solution  to 
the  Israeli-Palestinian-Arab  conflict.  Yet  each  side 
is still capable of revising its desired endstate and of 
necessary concessions to establish and preserve a long-
term truce, or even a longer-term peace.
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HAMAS AND ISRAEL:
CONLICTING STRATEGIES OF GROUP-
BASED POLITICS
Introduction.
  The conflict between Palestinians and Israelis has 
heightened  since  2001,  while  at  the  same  time  any 
major military threat to Israel from Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, 
or even Syria, has visibly declined. Israel, according 
to Chaim Herzog, Israel’s sixth President, had been 
“born in battle,” and would be “obliged to live by the 
sword.”1 Yet, the Israeli government’s conquest and 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza brought about a 
very difficult challenge, although resistance on a mass 
basis was only taken up years later in the First Intifadha. 
Israel could not tolerate Palestinian Arabs’ resistance 
of their authority on the legal basis of denial of self-
determination,2  and  eventually  preferred  to  grant 
some measures of self-determination while continuing 
to  consolidate  control  of  the  territories.  However,  a 
comprehensive peace, shimmering in the distance, has 
eluded all. Inter-Israeli and inter-Palestinian divisions 
deepened as peace danced closer before retreating. 
  Israel’s stance towards the democratically-elected 
Palestinian government headed by HAMAS in 2006 has 
been a major obstacle to substantive peacemaking. The 
reasons for Israel’s position, and HAMAS’ continuing 
verbal  support  of  resistance,  even  as  a  fragile  truce 
took hold on June 19, 2008, leads us to examine this 
relationship. 
  Since  the  outset  of  the  Second,  or  Al-Aqsa, 
Intifadha in 2000,3 Israeli security forces have killed 
4,718 Palestinians and 10 foreign citizens. Palestinians 
have  killed  236  Israeli  civilians,  244  Israeli  security 2
forces, and 17 foreign citizens.4 The numbers of dead 
and injured would be greatly inflated if we calculated 
the casualties in all of the Israeli-Arab wars. Another 
very negative outcome of the conflict that has inhibited 
Palestinian social and political development is the large 
numbers  of  Palestinians  detained  and  imprisoned, 
more than 700,000 since 1967, and the vast majority 
were  political  prisoners.  Today,  some  8,500  (Israel’s 
figure)5 to 11,229 (the Mandela Institute’s figure) are 
in  prison,  including  375  juveniles,  104  women,  and 
some 870 to 836 (B’tselem’s figure) are administrative 
detainees, in addition to about 3,000 at the time of this 
writing held by the Palestinian Authority (PA) (who 
primarily represent HAMAS prisoners of the Fatah-
dominated PA in the West Bank). It is difficult to find a 
Palestinian man, certainly not a HAMAS member of a 
certain age who has not experienced several temporary 
detentions  and  incarcerations.  Israel’s  High  Court 
banned  torture  in  1999  but  still  practices  isolation, 
prolonged interrogation, threats to family members, 
and denial of access to lawyers. 
  The conflict has moreover become a Muslim cause, 
and at the same time, remains a national one. To make 
matters worse, the Palestinian use of suicide attacks 
increased since their first appearance in the 1990s as a 
tactic to avenge Israeli killings of Palestinian civilians.6 
The  many  suicide  attacks,  often  by  self-recruited 
individuals, that became more frequent since 2000-01, 
presented a major challenge to Israel’s defense of its 
population centers. The attractions of martyrdom were 
not a phenomenon that could easily be extinguished 
by the Palestinian leadership, particularly when it had 
nothing concrete to offer its population in its stead, 
and the condition of that population had worsened, 
not improved, in the Oslo era. As peace agreements 3
between Israel and Egypt and Jordan had cancelled out 
the possibility of effective Arab resistance to Israel, only 
Palestinian bottom-up or popular action remained an 
option to Palestinians unable to obtain relief through 
diplomacy  or  political  participation.  Nevertheless, 
Palestinians, and even HAMAS, moved in these latter 
directions. 
  The  2006  electoral  success,  subsequent  Western 
and Israeli boycott of the HAMAS organization, and 
factional strife among Palestinians are important to an 
understanding  of  Islamist  movements,  counterter-
rorism,  counterinsurgency,  and  political  develop-
ment. 
  HAMAS’ strategic development will be described 
more fully below. HAMAS members’ internal debate 
on armed resistance is long-standing. As Dr. Naser El-
Din Al-Shaer, former Dean of the Islamic University 
and Minister of Education until the HAMAS govern-
ment was “fired” by Abbas, and a moderate who met 
with former President Jimmy Carter, explained: 
If  there  is  any  attack  on  the  Israelis,  they  speak  of 
terrorism and terrorism, and more terrorism. If Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad and all of these armed groups [such 
as Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade] cease attacking Israel, then 
Israel will say: “Look, they’ve lost their power; and they 
can do nothing against us, so we are not going to give 
them anything.” 
So by which means will Israel give our land back to us? 
If we are fully sovereign and we can attack the Israelis, 
then they identify us as we are terrorists and the whole 
world is supposed to side with them against us. And if 
we talk about peace, they said, “look they aren’t able to 
do anything, so look let us give them nothing.” So which 
language do they understand?74
Current Context.
  HAMAS  confronted  the  dismantling  of  its  edu-
cational and social initiatives over all the West Bank 
one and a half years after it began its struggle to govern. 
Citizens of West Bank towns were mistreated, brutally 
beaten, and detained on a nightly basis, not only by 
the  Israeli  Defense  Force  (IDF)  but  also  by  Fatah-
allied PA security officers.8 In just 1 week, Israel made 
38  military  raids  or  incursions  into  the  West  Bank, 
killing a child, wounding two others, and abducting 
48 civilians (without charge) including juveniles. This 
included a raid into al-Far`a refugee camp, responding 
to children demonstrating at the funeral of the child 
killed, and a demonstration against the separation Wall 
at Bil`in.9 This was perhaps a typical week in the West 
Bank, which, according to the Western media, is being 
peacefully controlled by the PA. Al-Shaer commented 
on those tortured in PA custody, including a 67-year-
old  man  who  had  suffered  a  cerebral  hemorrhage 
from severe beating. PA officers raided and closed the 
Islamic schools and charities, including one with 1,000 
students, in Nablus, Hebron, and Jenin—which have 
large concentrations of HAMAS supporters—and their 
institutional  boards  were  reconstituted  with  Fatah 
members. This is regarded widely as the PA’s efforts to 
follow Israeli (and perceived American) directions to 
root out HAMAS’ social support structure. Some 2,000 
persons were arrested.
  Shaer complained that the Abbas-controlled West 
Bank displayed a policy of “violence, not security,” and 
reported other scandalous types of corruption ongoing 
in the Fayyad-managed government headed by Abbas. 
He warned again that the population only sees a choice 
between continued humiliation and a mass popular 5
resistance, and that it might be impossible to reason 
against a new Intifadha.10 Just a day earlier, on August 
10, Palestinians had responded to the campaign against 
HAMAS  with  a  demonstration  calling  for  national 
unity.11
HAMAS Roots in Short.
  HAMAS  was  at  first  a  social  and  educational 
initiative of certain actors, primarily Shaykh Ahmed 
Yasin (c. 1937-2004) from within the Palestinian branch 
of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Yasin’s natal 
village of al-Jura was destroyed during the 1948 war, 
and his family fled to Gaza. He became a quadriplegic 
after  an  accident  at  the  age  of  12,  and  attended  al-
Azhar University in Cairo, where he was attracted to 
the Muslim Brotherhood. 
  HAMAS inherited all the hallmarks of a Muslim 
Brotherhood organization in its aim to create a more 
Islamic  society  out  of  a  conviction  that  developing 
the proper structures12 will bring about a truly moral 
(but  not  totalitarian)  Islamic  society.  Further,  it  has 
emphasized  unity  among  Muslims  and  idealizes 
Palestinian  unity,  and  eschews  takfir  (rejectionism, 
defining others as false Muslims), a key aspect of the 
ideology of radical salafis such as Osama bin Ladin. 
For many years, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood 
had put political activism on hold in Gaza, and focused 
instead on delivering religious and social services and 
missionary activity (da`wa). This tactical strategy was 
necessary to ensure the Brotherhood’s survival, as a 
result of the Egyptian government’s severe suppression 
of the Brethren. Even when the Brethren were released 
from  Egyptian  jails,  it  was  with  the  understanding 
that the group would not seek legal party status. The 6
group’s tactical approach in Gaza was to focus first on 
creating an Islamic social and political entity, for doing 
so, the group held, would eventually return Palestine 
to the Palestinians.13 
  Eventually,  the  founders  of  HAMAS  developed 
a  wing  for  militant  action,  thus  breaking  with 
the  Palestinian,  Egyptian,  and  Jordanian  Muslim 
Brotherhood’s more “movement-oriented” approach. 
HAMAS was then officially announced shortly after 
the outbreak of the First Intifadha. It gained support 
steadily in the population despite the signing of the 
Oslo Accords which the organization opposed, as did 
many other Palestinian factions and individuals. The 
suffering of much of the Palestinian population during 
the Oslo period, as well as the breakdown of Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations, together with Ariel Sharon’s 
incitement  of  Palestinians  by  insisting  on  bringing 
troops and signaling Israeli authority over the Haram 
al-Sharif—the  compound  containing  the  al-Aqsa 
Mosque and the Dome of the Rock that Israelis call 
the Temple Mount (to indicate the ruins of the Second 
Temple  underneath  the  ground)  in  Jerusalem—led 
to  the  al-Aqsa  or  Second  Intifadha.  In  this  second 
popular  uprising,  HAMAS,  as  well  as  Fatah-linked 
organizations, engaged in militancy. 
  In  the  1990s,  HAMAS  had  become  a  refuge  for 
many  of  those  Palestinians  who  disagreed  with  the 
aims and leadership of the Oslo initiative. A substantial 
number of members of the Popular Committees of the 
PLO, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP) also opposed Oslo, but these groups 
and HAMAS could agree on little other than continued 
resistance. The main thrust of HAMAS activities was 
not  militant  actions  against  Israel,  but  rather  social, 7
charitable, educational, and political programs aimed 
at Palestinians. 
  Civil  society  organizations  delivering  services 
and aid to the population have long been important 
in Palestinian camps and areas. Those created by the 
various arms of the PLO rivaled each other, and also 
to  some  extent  the  traditional  elites  in  Palestinian 
society. HAMAS was also able to draw on the salience 
of  religion  in  an  Islamizing  society.  The  number  of 
mosques in Gaza doubled between 1967 and 1987. The 
Mujama` Islami model in Gaza established by Shaykh 
Yassin provided a different type of mosque community 
than the traditional one, offering affordable services 
and  programs,  often  located  within  the  mosques 
themselves.14 
  HAMAS  also  founded  the  Scientific  Medical 
Association in 1997 which operated medical and dental 
services and a blood bank.15 The group established the 
Association  for  Science  and  Culture,  and  provided 
education  from  kindergarten  through  eighth  grade 
for Gazans. The Islamic Workers Union was set up in 
1992. All of these efforts were extremely important, 
as were the creation of other educational bodies and 
the  establishment  of  student  blocs  of  support  and 
organizations of professionals and women’s associa-
tions  which  challenged  some  of  the  more  secular-
feminist orientation of other Palestinian groups.16 
  Especially  after  September  11,  2001  (9/11),  U.S. 
advisors  argued  that  a  crackdown  on  HAMAS’ 
charitable  activities  was  of  paramount  importance. 
Dennis  Ross  and  Matthew  Levitt  characterize  the 
group’s  charitable  and  educational  activities  as 
nefarious  efforts  at  recruitment,  or  to  socialize  new 
suicide bombers,17 decrying the addition of “Koranic 
memorization centers” that “mimic in a religious setting 8
the  tight  clique-like  structure  of  the  terrorist  cell.”18 
American and Israeli targeting of Muslim charitable or 
social organizations was not a novel policy. Israeli and 
American pressure had already been put on Arafat who 
closed more than 20 HAMAS organizations in 1997, 
and more closures took place in 2001 and 2002.19 What 
was new, post-9/11, was an additional series of attacks 
on organizations thought to provide aid to HAMAS 
from abroad such as the Holy Land Foundation in the 
United States which was closed in 2001, but against 
which  the  government  failed  to  secure  a  conviction 
in  the  Dallas-based  trial  which  concluded  in  2007.20 
The logic that the PA could replace the charitable and 
social services provided by HAMAS was faulty. It did 
not, but an important aim of HAMAS in 2004-05 was to 
reinstate some services to which it devotes the majority 
(something like 95 percent) of its annual budget. 
  Given  the  favorable  perception  of  HAMAS,  the 
negative perception of Arafat’s clique-like leadership, 
and chaotic battles between youths loyal to different 
groups, as well as criminality and corruption, no one 
should  have  been  surprised  by  HAMAS’  electoral 
victory in 2006. At the time of this writing, the Israeli 
military and security sectors are in disaccord over the 
proper  approach  to  the  Palestinian  population  and 
HAMAS, despite a fragile truce engineered by external 
Arab states, which began June 19, 2008. 
  This monograph  suggests  that  an  understanding 
of  the  diverging  paths  of  Israeli  and  HAMAS’ 
strategic thought, along with an overview of HAMAS’ 
development,  explains  the  stand-off.  Further,  an 
understanding of the American role in the emergence 
of a regional security regime is useful. The United States 
can project power, aid deterrence, provide equipment, 
elicit  cooperation,  and  provide  formal  and  informal 9
guarantees, thus its role seems essential in any solution 
to the current deadlock. However, the type of security 
regime that the United Status supports, such as the 
alliance  between  Israel  and  Mahmud  Abbas’  Fatah 
elements of the PA, may not necessarily be effective or 
durable, as Robert Lieber had suggested in a general 
analysis of the issue in the period following the first 
Gulf War.21 
  Disagreements  within  the  Israeli  military  and 
political  establishments  over  the  national  security 
objectives of that country reveal HAMAS’ placement 
at  the  nexus  of  Israel’s  domestic,  Palestinian,  and 
regional objectives. This process can be traced back to 
Ariel Sharon’s formation of the KADIMA Party, and the 
decision to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza without 
engaging in a peace process with Palestinians. 
  The  reasons  for  this  new  strategy  were:  the 
assumption  that  it  is  unlikely  that  Arab  armies 
would  launch  a  conventional  attack  against  Israel; 
fear  of  vulnerability  within  Israeli-held  areas;  and 
Israeli unwillingness to bargain with key Palestinian 
leadership (Arafat, the “new” Fatah as represented by 
imprisoned political figure Marwan Barghouti, or the 
Hamas leaders). It was now thought that Israel should 
hold to a defensive line encircling its citizens rather 
than holding on to Gaza and the West Bank for troop 
dispersal.22 This new thinking comprised a defensive 
strategy that did not exactly replace, but stood alongside 
other Israeli approaches, for instance, that described by 
Yitzhak Shamir as aggressive defense, in other words, 
offensives  aimed  at  creating  security  zones—in  the 
south of Lebanon, notably to extend Israel’s strategic 
depth. 10
  The occupied territories had also been thought of 
as being valuable in land for peace negotiations, and 
during the Oslo process, according to one line of Israeli 
thought,  Israel  was  ready  to  withdraw  entirely  in 
order to obtain peace.23 Palestinians might argue that, 
in fact, Israel was never serious about this exchange, 
and  its  land-settlement  policies  during  the  Oslo 
period demonstrate this, as hundreds of settlements 
were established and/or expanded, and settlers were 
provided with various types of incentives, tax breaks, 
and other benefits. Settlers’ safety, particularly in transit 
to and from the settlements, is an enormous headache 
for  the  Israeli  authorities.  Their  resort  to  vigilante 
violence against Palestinians is an aspect of the conflict 
often overlooked in the Western media. Added to this 
lack of commitment was the failure of the parties to 
grapple with final status issues—Palestinian refugees, 
Jerusalem, etc. The optimism about negotiating and 
“Oslo expectations” faded with the al-Aqsa Intifadha, 
and Israelis blamed Palestinians for this failure, leading 
to claims and frequent statements from the Israeli Right 
and part of the Israeli Left that there was no “partner to 
peace.” 
  Another segment of the Israeli Left has continued 
until  this  day  to  argue  for  land-for-peace  and 
complete withdrawal from the territories. Still others 
recalculated  the  main  threat  as  Palestinians  who 
could, and did, threaten Israeli centers of population 
with  suicide  bombings,  adding  to  that  threat,  the 
Palestinians living inside of Israel (Arab Israelis) who 
make up 20 percent of the population. Calls for their 
relocation or repatriation to the West Bank continue, 
and their employment, and that of Palestinians from 
the West Bank and Gaza, has been supplanted, Israeli 
policies against immigrant workers notwithstanding, 
by foreign non-Jewish immigrant workers. 11
  According to Barry Rubin, the Israeli military felt 
the threat posed by Palestinians would not significantly 
increase, but that if settlers could be evacuated and 
a stronger line of defense erected, they could better 
defend their citizenry. That thinking led to the Wall 
or Security Fence. The remaining threat was missiles 
launched  from  Gaza,  and  indeed  these  continued. 
Israel claimed significant victories in its war against 
Palestinians by the use of targeted killings of leadership, 
boycotts, power cuts, etc., but also admitted that it had 
not “defeated the will to resistance.”24 Of course, this 
sentiment  speaks  directly  to  the  ultimate  challenge 
of all insurgencies in which the settler, or colonial, or 
invading power, essentially loses the war, if not specific 
battles, from the moment the resistance gains popular 
support.25 And it shows that the situation might not be 
indefinitely manageable, and that Palestinians, despite 
every  possible  effort  made  to  weaken,  incriminate, 
and separate Arab allies from their interests, or pay 
collaborators, might yet edge Israelis—if they move 
away  from  their  own  politicians’  and  military’s 
thinking—back toward comprehensive negotiations. 
  In a remarkable sequence of events, Fatah elements 
of the PA battled HAMAS and, despite the military 
training provided to them under U.S. auspices, they lost 
control of Gaza. The fratricidal 4-day conflict resulted 
in 80 fatalities; some were the settling of old scores, said 
Hanan Ashrawi, an independent Palestinian politician. 
Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades carried out 
revenge  actions,  killing  some,  abducting  some  23 
persons,  and  attacking  HAMAS-linked  institutions 
in  the  West  Bank.  In  a  confusing  move,  thought  to 
originate with U.S. advice but also with Israeli stances 
toward HAMAS in mind,26 Mahmoud Abbas (whose 
supporters  had  lost  the  election,  but  who  had  been 12
named  to  head  the  government  because  HAMAS 
wanted a unity government with Fatah) said he would 
dissolve his Cabinet, including Prime Minister Ismail 
Haniyeh of HAMAS, and that he would call for new 
elections.  Haniyeh  declared  his  intent  to  establish 
order in Gaza and called Abbas’ decision hasty.27
  HAMAS,  which  keeps  only  a  token  force  in  the 
West Bank, and does not admit its strength there, did 
not interfere with Abbas, but as his decision to replace 
Haniyeh with Salim Fayyad was illegal, Haniyeh is 
regarded as the Prime Minister of the PA by many 
Palestinians. The issue was that Abbas could dissolve 
the Cabinet, but had no constitutional right to appoint 
a  new  prime  minister,  or  to  dissolve  the  elected 
Parliament  or  call  for  new  elections  (which  Israelis, 
Fatah, and perhaps Washington, hoped would undo 
the HAMAS’ majority). 
  HAMAS  set  about  restoring  order  in  Gaza,  and 
Abbas refused to recognize the HAMAS government 
there and, likewise, the Israelis and Americans speak 
only  with  his  faction.  Palestinians  in  Gaza  then 
experienced an Israeli, American, and European cut-
off of funds, then services, fuel, medicines, and finally 
food. The boycott on funds appeared to be a somewhat 
desperate attempt to cause Palestinians to overthrow 
HAMAS in Gaza in 2007. People began using cooking 
oil to drive automobiles and taxis, and were severely 
impacted by the boycott and closure. 
  Sieges  abound  in  the  history  of  warfare.  The 
names of Jerusalem, Vienna, and Missalonghi come to 
mind. The idea of provoking a popular uprising has 
also recurred; unsuccessfully pursued by the British, 
French,  and  Israelis  in  the  1956  Suez  (or  Tripartite) 
War. Anthony Eden supposed the Egyptian population 
would  overthrow  President  Jamal  abd  al-Nasir. 13
Ironically, the attacks cemented Nasir’s popularity and 
vindicated his claims that the former colonial powers 
were conspiring with the new Zionist state they had 
helped establish. This time around, the Jerusalem Post 
trumpeted every action against HAMAS in Gaza and 
every  instance  of  violence  against  Fatah,  and  many 
articles expressed fear of life in an Islamic state, which 
the Post calls “Hamasistan.” Yet, the Gazan population 
did not overthrow their leadership. 
  All in all, HAMAS, after the initial, very regrettable 
violence  in  Gaza,  restored  order,  and  though 
continuing  to  battle  certain  powerful  clans,  earned 
respect; instituting the first “911” emergency telephone 
service, and operating more efficiently than expected, 
considering  the  boycott  and  the  organized  violence 
directed  against  it  by  the  above-mentioned  clans 
(like  the  Dughmush)  and  Fatah,  both  with  external 
funding.28  HAMAS  discouraged  the  pro-Al-Qai’da 
groups operating in Gaza, although they did not have 
total  control  over  the  Islamic  Army  or  Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad. 
  In February 2008, almost one-half of the 1.2 million 
Gazan population breached the Egyptian border to buy 
food and supplies that they had been denied for months 
under the Israeli boycott. This created a good deal of 
stress  on  the  Israeli-Egyptian  political  relationship. 
Israel  expected  Egypt  to  moderate,  even  terminate 
its support for HAMAS; something that the Egyptian 
government could not do, given the strength of popular 
Egyptian  support  for  HAMAS  and  the  Palestinians 
trapped in Gaza. Israel (and also Washington) have 
maintained  since  that  a  condition  of  allowing  the 
Rafah border to be opened would be for the Egyptians 
to pressure HAMAS from using the tunnels, allegedly 
used to bring arms into Gaza, although more recently 14
to bring in food. Egypt agreed to dynamite the tunnels, 
but they remain an issue. Further, Israel wanted Egypt 
to pressure HAMAS to release Gilad Shalit. Shalit, an 
Israeli soldier, was captured in a raid on the Kerem 
Shalom  crossing  on  June  25,  2006,  by  three  armed 
groups, one of which was the Army of Islam. He was 
eventually transferred to HAMAS’ custody, and the 
movement wants a prisoner exchange. 
  For  months  Israel  steadfastly  rejected  diplomacy 
involving  HAMAS  and  HAMAS’  truce  appeals  as 
offered  by  Ismail  Haniyeh  early  in  2008,  but  after 
efforts by Saudi Arabia and Qatar to mend the conflict 
between Fatah and HAMAS and a deal negotiated by 
Egypt, it entered into a temporary 6-month truce with 
HAMAS on June 19, 2008.29 
  Israel’s greatest fear has been a united, properly 
coordinated and prepared Arab and Palestinian attack. 
Given  Israel’s  rejection  of  all  comprehensive  peace 
offers by the Arabs and its forging and maintenance 
of separate agreements with Egypt and Jordan, it no 
longer fears such a coordinated attack by Palestinians 
and  other  Arab  nations.  It  also  seeks  to  prevent 
Palestinian factions from uniting and pursuing a full 
scale resistance as during the Al Aqsa Intifadha. Then 
actions coincided, although the factions were far from 
unified. 
  It has frequently been predicted that Israel should 
(and could) reconquer the Gaza strip, a rather futile 
overturning  of  its  “new  strategy,”  or,  as  suggested 
prior to HAMAS’ electoral victory, engage the Pales-
tinians  in  a  war  over  the  West  Bank,  or  both.  The 
“conflict-oriented” elements in Israel want it to engage 
in “preemptive deterrence” or attacks on other states 
in the region, perhaps Iran,30 Lebanon31 (because lack 
of preparation for the 2006 war was deemed the main 
issue), or Syria32 in the longer term. 15
  HAMAS’ initial strategy of armed resistance and 
popular uprising against Israel has been tamed as it 
has instead pursued political participation, accepted 
the notion of a limited area of an envisioned Palestinian 
state, and in its calmings and truces which acknowledge 
(and therefore “recognize”) Israel in a de facto manner.33 
It was severely criticized for this change in strategy by 
Ayman Zawahiri. Yet it continues to hold out the threat 
of  popular  resistance  should  negotiations  fail  and 
occupation continue, and is struggling militarily and 
politically against Fatah, its brother organization. Such 
civil strife is not HAMAS’ preferred mode, and it has 
taken many unwanted steps and actions to seek an end 
to this strife which is fueled by external actors as well 
as internal divisions. HAMAS has put its vision of an 
Islamic state on hold as well as its general political stance 
of  “positive  versus  negative  freedom”34—tolerating, 
even  recommending diversity  and  representation  of 
other groups, if Palestinian autonomy can be pursued. 
  The  underlying  strategies  of  both  Israel  and 
HAMAS do not elicit strong optimism in a solution 
to the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict, but each is still 
capable of revising its strategies, or desired end-states 
and  establishing  a  long-term  truce,  or  better  yet,  a 
longer-term peace. 
  A peaceful resolution to this conflict should remain a 
primary objective of Israel, the Palestinians, other Arab 
and Muslim nations, and of the United States. The Arab-
Israeli conflict has complicated regional development 
in myriad ways, and remains a key grievance for a far 
broader Muslim population who see in it perfidy and 
hypocrisy by Israel, and that Israel’s strongest ally, the 
United States, has not acted as a fair and neutral broker 
in affairs of the region. 16
  If the next American president turns his attention 
to  the  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict  in  a  sustained, 
methodical, and creative manner together with other 
Quartet  members  and  perhaps  Arab  delegates  until 
resolution, then an important co-condition for success 
in the Global War on Terror will be achieved, as well 
as an enormous benefit to the citizens, economies, and 
political development of the region. 
 
Summary of Recommendations. 
  A better understanding of HAMAS, its history and 
evolution, the reasons for and level of sympathies from 
Palestinians and other Muslim and Arab nations for 
the organization, and its stances on various issues is 
imperative for policymakers because the Islamist and 
nationalist base of support for the organization and its 
essential principles is not likely to disappear. 
  To the degree that the United States is committed 
to the establishment of a just and sovereign Palestinian 
entity, it would also behoove policymakers to consider 
carefully  the  ramifications  of  making  alliances 
selectively  with  specific  groups  and  actors  in  any 
society.  The  consequences  of  such  alliances  forged 
during the Saddam period with opposition groups can 
now be seen in Iraq, where the obvious “losers” in the 
new balance of power, Sunni Arabs, especially those 
with  geographical  and  political  links  to  the  former 
regime, felt they had no stake in the new government. 
The  Shi‛i  parties  were  supposed  to  include  these 
groups  in  military  and  police  structures  but  have 
not yet done so. In the Palestinian case, the current 
preferences for dealing with, or restricting U.S. support 
only to followers of Mahmud Abbas or members of 
his  nonelected  government  in  the  West  Bank  have 17
backfired, given the staying power of HAMAS. It would 
be best if these elements eventually chose to support a 
broader Palestinian alliance. Indeed, this is HAMAS’ 
position, but it rests on a shift within the PA. 
  Meanwhile,  more  constructive  policy  avenues 
such  as  supporting  the  building  of  Palestinian 
institutions (with appropriate transparency35), aiding 
reform,  and  planning  for  the  economic  well-being 
of Palestinian society have taken a backseat to 2006 
and 2007 actions intended to strangle HAMAS, all of 
which were ineffective, or thus far, destructive. Some 
similarities with the South African and Irish situations 
are instructive.36 The violence, while not symmetrical, 
has gone so far as to injure the moral standing of both 
parties—Israelis  and  Palestinians  (associated  with 
HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad [PIJ], and certain 
other  groups)  even  if  national  survival  is  at  stake. 
Yet,  in  the  Irish  case,  negotiators  included  the  Sinn 
Fein;  and  in  the  South  African  case,  the  previously 
violent actions of the African National Congress were 
permitted to recede into the past so that a new society, 
free of racial injustice, could be established. 
  The first course of action that I had recommended in 
January 2008 was to accept the offer of Ismail Haniyeh 
to a restored truce. The temporary truce concluded on 
June 17, 2008, was therefore an important first step. 
  A much more significant prisoner exchange needs 
to take place. Fewer than 500 of the 10,000 Palestinian 
political prisoners were released in 2006-07. Palestinians 
should prevail on HAMAS to release Shalit as an act 
of good faith. HAMAS, however, is adamant that a 
substantial number of its prisoners be released in the 
exchange.37  The  Israeli  and  international  boycott  of 
the PA government is also supposed to end under the 
current truce, and this is absolutely essential to restore 18
key services, medicines, foods, and reprovide salaries. 
HAMAS’  and  other  charitable  social  services  which 
have been attacked in the West Bank must be put back 
under professional management. There is no reason 
for them to operate as Fatah, rather than as HAMAS’ 
entities. However, they can and must do so with the 
greatest degree of transparency,38 as should town zakat 
committees, which are a very important source of social 
welfare. 
  Israel  needs  to  abandon  the  aspects  of  its  new 
defensive  strategy  which  are  calculated  to  thwart 
peace  efforts.  Reliance  on  perimeter  control  as 
through barriers has, along with years of constricting 
movement, curfews, and land acquisition policies, led 
to a terrible apartheid-like separation of the population 
and threatens any coherence to the West Bank. It may 
be  impossible  to  convince  Israel  to  dismantle  the 
security fence, known as the Wall. But there would be 
a great benefit to doing so. The Jewish and Palestinian 
populations do not need to be herded into separate 
areas—they need to be reacquainted with each other, 
as segregation has bred hatred and fear. Further, the 
Israeli  military’s  desire  to  engage  in  limited  partial 
and  temporary  withdrawals,  followed  by  territorial 
reconquests is antithetical to conflict resolution as it 
destroys the prospect of trust. 
  As  a  HAMAS  spokesperson  stated:  “We  are  not 
against trust or security. We know the Israelis would 
like  to  have  security.  .  .  but  at  the  same  time,  we 
know we cannot live with our own liquidation.” To 
the same degree, when HAMAS reserves the option 
of reengaging in violent jihad, the trust that must—if 
there is to be peace—be extended by Israelis is eroded. 
A long-term truce must be safe for all, honorable, bring 
justice, and a remedy to the Palestinians who have been 19
deprived their self-determination and their freedom, 
but also ensure an end to violence. 
  The deepest challenge to HAMAS is that, in return 
for territory, it must abandon the strategy of militant 
resistance and focus on supplying good governance. It 
will need to uncouple the dream of martyrdom from 
nationalist violence, for its own cadres and other youth. 
That may only be accomplished, given the religious 
strictures  around  jihad  that  HAMAS  recognizes 
through the device of a long-term truce, but that truce 
would be desirable. 
  The  world  community  should  discourage  Israel 
from enacting further restrictions on Palestinians that 
will prevent them from working inside of Israel. This 
has debased both the Israeli national conception of its 
citizens and further transformed Gaza and the West   
Bank into Bantustans, confining a population which 
used to work inside of Israel. An economic and develop- 
mental solution needs the input of all parties, in addition 
to the political/military situation, so that Palestinians 
do not live in closed areas devoid of sufficient employ-
ment, or food and goods, as prompted the flight to Egypt 
in early 2008. A return to the more hopeful planning 
of a Palestinian state, as evinced in several studies,39 
is required. In the last years, the United States shifted 
its emphasis toward state-building in the Middle East 
to Iraq, and secondarily to Afghanistan, necessarily so. 
However, it has not been wise to diminish its peace 
efforts  to  symbolic  exchanges  of  good  intent  with 
select factions of the Palestinians and Israelis (while 
sponsoring  a  “Contra-like”  action  against  HAMAS 
under  supporters  of  Muhammad  Dahlan  and  other 
Fatah elements). U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East 
would be greatly strengthened with an entente between 
Israel and all of the Palestinians. 20
  While  this  should  eventually  determine  “final 
status”  compromises,  it  need  not  do  so  at  present, 
as  Haim  Malka  has  recommended,  but  reentering 
a  phase  of  negotiating—with  all  parties,  including 
HAMAS—is essential. (Should negotiations falter, he 
then recommends a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from 
the  West  Bank.)40  Palestinians,  even  Ahmed  Qurei, 
and Sari Nusseibeh, have stated that there is a limited 
window for negotiations now, and each have suggested 
a return to the notion of a one-state solution, which I 
believe would be disastrous for the Palestinians. 
Background. 
  HAMAS, meaning zeal or enthusiasm (an acronym 
for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya or the Move-
ment of the Islamic Resistance), is an offshoot of the 
Islamist trend in Palestinian society. HAMAS’ origins 
are with the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brother-
hood movement (referred to as Ikhwan or Brethren) 
which dates back to the 1940s, and the Egyptian parent 
branch which dates back to 1928. However, it should 
also be noted that Fatah (the largest of the four organi-
zations  of  the  PLO)  was  not  exclusively  or  partic- 
ularly  secularist.  Indeed,  the  founding  members  of 
Fatah,  with  the  exception  of  Yasir  Arafat,  were  all 
members  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  organization, 
which later produced HAMAS. 
  HAMAS’  rather  late  emergence  evolved  from 
Israel’s antagonism to Palestians and the necessarily 
quiescent policies of the Muslim Brotherhood toward 
both  Egypt  and  Jordan.  The  Muslim  Brotherhood 
was  challenged  by  the  Saraya  al-Jihad  al-Islami,  or 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which emerged in the early 21
1980s and began to attract the support of Palestinian 
youth. Clearly, other reasons for popular support for 
a  new  type  of  Palestinian  resistance  movement  can 
also be traced to the exodus of the PLO leadership to 
Lebanon from 1967-70 and its forced retreat to Tunis, 
following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. This 
distant leadership reacted to, rather than led, grass-
roots developments like the First Intifadha in the Pales-
tinian occupied territories. 
  Other  important  reasons  for  the  emergence  of 
HAMAS (and Islamic Jihad and other Islamist actors 
like the Islamic Movement inside Israel and smaller 
salafist organizations) were the worsening economic 
conditions in the territories, and the effect of Israel’s 
counterinsurgent measures taken first against the PLO 
and later against all other forms of Palestinian political, 
cultural,  intellectual,  and  militant  associations  and 
activities. The heightening of Islamist sentiment in the 
Middle East as in Palestinian communities in exile has 
only increased since HAMAS’ official establishment in 
1987.
  Some accounts simply describe HAMAS emerging 
from the previously-mentioned organization called the 
Mujama` Islami established by Shaykh Ahmed Yasin, 
who became an extremely popular preacher and scholar 
upon his return to Gaza from Egypt. One account links 
two  paramilitary  organizations,  a  Security  Section   
(Jihaz  al-Amn)  and  al-Mujahidun  al-Falastiniyun 
(which  included  the  Izz  al-Din  Qassam  brigades), 
directly to Shaykh Yasin.41 In fact, the rationale and 
preparations for militant activities against the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza date to the late 
1970s as Yasin and others believed that the “jihad as 
da`wa” must be complemented with jihad as armed 
struggle. 22
  Earlier the Brotherhood had decided not to support 
Khalil al-Wazir’s initial suggestion in 1957 to form a 
group to liberate Palestine.42 Certain individuals went 
ahead  anyway  and  formed  the  Palestine  National 
Liberation Movement, Fatah. Fatah’s belief was that a 
national liberation movement would impel the Arab 
armies to fight for the Palestinian cause. President Jamal 
abd al-Nasir of Egypt, a highly popular figure in the 
Arab world, had suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood 
following  an  alleged  assassination  attempt  on  him 
in 1956. Nasir was supported by Palestinians for his 
commitment to Arab nationalism and unity. Yet, like 
King Husayn of Jordan, his aims were not identical 
with Palestinians’ guerrilla efforts, which elicited sharp 
Israeli responses and military attacks. 
  The  1967  defeat  of  the  Arab  armies  showed  the 
disappointing  result  of  Palestinian  reliance  on  Arab 
governments  and  militaries  as  far  as  many  were 
concerned,  among  them  Shaykh  Yasin.  He  was 
convinced  that  Palestinians  must  mount  their  own 
resistance,  and  began  focusing  on  cadre  formation, 
participation in, and organization of demonstrations 
and strikes. A conference was held in Amman in 1983 
at which time a decision was made to support jihad by 
the Ikhwan in Palestine. Simultaneously, $70,000 raised 
by the Kuwaiti branch of the Ikhwan was received by 
the  Palestine  Committee  (also  known  as  the  Inside 
Committee).43  Various  committees  were  established 
by  Palestinian  Ikhwan  from  Jordan,  Saudi  Arabia, 
and other Gulf states to support the resolutions taken 
in Amman, and within a few years, a body, the Jihaz 
Falastin (Palestine Apparatus), was in operation. 
  Meanwhile,  Shaykh  Yasin  began  buying  arms, 
mainly from the Israeli black market, but was stung 
by Israeli collaborators. Those involved were caught, 23
tortured by Israelis, and revealed the network up to 
Shaykh Yasin, who was arrested and put on trial in 
1984.44 The Israelis found about half of the weapons 
purchased; the others were hidden. Yasin was released 
from  jail  in  the  Ahmad  Jibril  prisoner  exchange  in 
1985.45  The  entire  incident  bolstered  those  Ikhwan, 
particularly in the West Bank, who had maintained 
that  armed  jihad  against  Israel,  as  a  local  initiative, 
would fail, and that the correct path was to continue 
working toward an Islamic state.
  However, the movement acquired martyrs during 
a  1986  protest  at  Bir  Zeit  University  and  became 
increasingly  popular  and  participatory  in  public 
events.  During  the  Intifadha,  the  `Amn  (or  security 
arm of HAMAS) became active and went after Israeli 
collaborators  in  squads  known  as  the  Majd.  These 
in turn also embarked on armed actions against the 
Israelis after the Intifadha began in 1987. 
  HAMAS was announced shortly after the outbreak 
of the Intifadha on December 14, 1987, though it made 
December 8, 1987, its official date of establishment to 
coincide  with  the  Intifadha.46  Its  founders  included 
Shaykh Ahmad Yasin; Salah Shahadah, a former stu-
dent leader who headed the military wing; Muham-
mad Sha`ah; Abd al-`Aziz Rantisi, a physician at the Is- 
lamic  University;  `Isa  al-Nashar;  Ibrahim  al-Yazuri; 
Abd al-Fattah Dukhan; and Yahya al-Sinuwwar. 
Postponement of Militant Islamism? 
  As explained above, HAMAS and the Islamic trend 
emerged  more  belatedly  than  in  other  parts  of  the 
Muslim world due to Palestinian dislocation and the 
struggle against Israel. When those secular Palestinians 
committed  to  armed  resistance  were  essentially 24
neutralized with their exile from Lebanon and moved 
towards negotiation, other ordinary Palestinians were 
greatly disappointed by the peace negotiation process. 
They instead arrived at a new commitment to armed 
resistance  so  long  as  Israel  opposed  the  return  of 
territory and sovereignty to Palestinians. This elided 
with the populism and support for resistance that was 
expressed in the Intifadha. 
  Decades  earlier,  a  small  militant  Palestinian 
Islamist group was led by `Izz al-Din al-Qassam (1882-
1935) who was killed in Jenin by the British, although 
his  followers,  the  Qassamiyun,  continued  to  fight 
in  the  Great  Uprising  of  1936-39.47  HAMAS  named 
its  own  military  wing  after  this  proto-revolutionary 
movement. 
  A  transregional  emergence  of  similar  groups  in 
the region appeared by the late 1970s. However, the 
growth of viable political institutions in general was 
inhibited among Palestinians because of their status 
as  a  people  without  a  state  and  the  tight  security 
controls imposed by Israel on the population. These, 
on the one hand, meant close surveillance and frequent 
detentions or arrests of Palestinians. At the same time, 
Israel’s  attacks  on  Palestinians,  land  policies,  and 
extreme restrictions on movements, communications, 
publication, education, and all aspects of normal life 
which were intended to protect the Israeli population 
inspired first the guerrilla-style attacks of the fida’iyin 
and the more secular nationalist PLO. 
  The  Muslim  Brotherhood  referred  to  above  was 
established  in  Egypt  in  1928  by  Hasan  al-Banna,  a 
schoolteacher who believed that Muslims, particularly 
their youth, required a force for unity, aid, develop-
ment, and education, and should take a direction other 
than  that  proposed  by  nationalist  elites.  The  Breth- 25
ren  (Ikhwan)  set  up  branches  in  Syria,  the  Sudan, 
Libya, the Gulf states, Jordan (which influenced the 
West Bank), and Gaza. From 1948 through the 1950s, 
military  rule  over  the  Palestinians  was  sufficiently 
repressive,  and  the  Brothers  both  there  and  within 
Egypt were under siege, either underground or put in 
prison by the Nasir regime, or in exile. For 2 decades, 
the  Palestinian  Muslim  Brotherhood  focused  on  its 
religious,  educational, and social missions, and was 
quiescent politically. That changed with the 1987 (First) 
Intifadha also known as the intifadha of stones, because 
the Palestinians were primarily reacting to Israeli force 
in  demonstrations  by  throwing  stones  and  burning 
tires. However, the outburst of popular resistance even 
in the face of constant and numerous arrests, collective 
punishments,  destruction  of  property,  and  other 
punitive actions, and Israel’s use of live ammunition 
against  children  armed  with  stones,  along  with  the 
new use of videos, made Israel subject to international 
condemnation. This sort of condemnation, emanating 
more strongly from Europe than the United States, was 
unlike any it had faced in countering militant attacks of 
the Palestinian fighters over the border in Lebanon, or 
as the target of terrorist aircraft hijackings in the period 
from 1969 to about 1974. 
  The  Muslim  Brotherhood  had  advocated  da‛wa, 
which is the reform and Islamization of society and 
thought;  `adala  (social  justice);  and  an  emphasis  on 
hakimiyya  (the  sovereignty  of  God,  as  opposed  to 
temporal  rule).  Due  to  the  severe  repression  of  the 
Muslim Brotherhood in both Egypt and Jordan, the 
Palestinian Ikhwan were influenced, or even restrained 
by the parent organization, to support da`wa rather than 
militant jihad (or jihad by the sword48). HAMAS broke 
with the previous tactical thinking of the Palestinian 26
Muslim  Brotherhood  in  an  important  way  when  it 
turned to armed resistance against Israel. 
Islamic Jihad. 
  The  Ikhwan  were  at  first  sidelined  both  by  the 
spontaneous  activism  of  Palestinians  of  various 
backgrounds  (PLO  and  other)  and  by  Islamic  Jihad 
which had accelerated its operations in 1986 and 1987. 
Harakat  al-Jihad  al-Islami  fi  Filastin  (The  Movement 
of  Islamic  Jihad  in  Palestine,  known  as  PIJ)  was 
established by Fathi Shiqaqi, Shaykh `Abd al-`Aziz al-
`Awda, and others, including current director general 
Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, in the Gaza Strip in the 
1970s following their acceptance in Egypt of an Islamist 
vision similar to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 
However, these Palestinians distinguished themselves 
from secular nationalists and antinationalist Islamists 
in calling for grassroots organization and armed jihad 
to liberate Palestine as part of the Islamic solution.49 
The PIJ military apparatus known as Saraya al-Quds 
(Jerusalem  Brigades)  was  operative  by  1985,  and 
attacked Israeli military at an induction ceremony in 
1986 known as the Gate of Moors operation. Palestinian 
youth, who were both territorially and generationally 
neglected by the PLO leadership that had been forcibly 
moved to Tunis, admired the militance of this group.
HAMAS’ Growth. 
  Yasin’s successful institutionalization through the 
Mujama` Islami, fundraising and da`wa via the earlier 
established Jam`iyah Islamiyah (1967) funded HAMAS’ 
growth. In Gaza, where the Muslim Brothers had less 
prestige in some ways than other Palestinian thinkers, 27
Yasin  reprinted  the  last  volume  of  Sayyid  Qutb’s 
monumental Fi Dhilal al-Qur’an, a nontraditional tafsir, 
or explanation and interpretation of the “art” of the 
Quran, with funds from the Jam`iyah. In this way, he 
was able to introduce Qutb (d. 1966) now known in 
the West primarily as a “radical” martyr, executed by 
Egypt’s President Nasir, as a “revolutionary fighting 
for justice and as a scholar of the highest standing”50 
because of the subject matter (the study of the Qur’an) 
and  his  sophisticated  treatment.  The  Mujama`/
mosque-building/charitable  phase  of  HAMAS  was 
also successful due to its international connections. 
  The  Muslim  Brotherhood  in  Jordan  was  able  to 
deliver aid from Arab countries and scholarships for 
promising students.51 While the Israelis were cracking 
down on the PLO, religious and charitable organizations 
in the occupied territories encountered somewhat less 
interference until 1977. The number of mosques under 
Ikhwan authority doubled and offered kindergartens, 
Qur’an classes, and free circumcisions on certain days. 
The Ikhwan paid for the accompanying celebrations 
for circumcisions, and mobile medical units provided 
low cost or free services.52 As described above, HAMAS 
moved actively into the areas of labor representation, 
education, professional associations, and throughout 
all sectors of Palestinian society in Gaza and also in the 
West Bank. 
  Various  figures  and  their  connections  with  the 
Ikhwan  in  Egypt  were  key  to  HAMAS’  emergence, 
and so, too, was the degree of repression inside Israeli 
jails.  Israeli  journalist  Amira  Hass  writes  that  “tens 
of  thousands  of  Palestinians  came  to  know  Israelis 
through  the  experience  of  prisons  and  detention 
camps.”53 Palestinians were often held for 2 to 4 months 
or more without being charged, and were subjected to 
harsh interrogations, including torture.54 As prisoners 28
tried to unite to obtain radios, legally mandated visits, 
and then later other concessions by going on hunger 
strikes since 1971, the Israeli authorities first physically 
separated them in different locations, and, later, more 
effectively  divided  them  by  providing  employment 
within prison to some but not others. The Islamization 
of Palestinian society ongoing outside of the prison 
walls began to be replicated inside as well. 
  The impetus to opposition was fostered in a different 
way  by  the  nationalist-religious  Israeli  coalition  in 
power from 1977. This government promoted settle-
ment activity in the West Bank among which a Jewish 
group with extreme messianic views, the Gush Emunim, 
were important. One focus of such right wing groups 
was on symbols of Judaism, and new sources of conflict 
erupted where these symbols conflicted with Muslim 
claims, for instance at the Haram al-Sharif, or Temple 
Mount site in Jerusalem; the Haram al-Ibrahimi mosque 
in Hebron; and elsewhere. Two Muslims were killed in 
1982 at the Haram al-Sharif, and a group tried to blow 
up the site in 1984. Another Jewish group threatened to 
destroy other Muslim shrines, and two students were 
murdered at the Islamic University of Hebron.55 This 
caused  more  identification  with  religious-nationalist 
causes,  certainly  seen  later  after  the  massacre  of 
Muslims  at  the  al-Ibrahimi  mosque,  which  sparked 
HAMAS’ first suicide attacks, and when Ariel Sharon 
brought troops onto the Haram al-Sharif. 
  The Palestinian diaspora was also affected by the 
growth of the new Islamist thinking. The Palestinian 
Ikhwan student movement in Kuwait was inspired by 
such non-Ikhwan figures as Shaykh Hasan Ayyub.56 
Palestinian  politics  have  played  out  in  student 
movements  featuring  strong  factionalism  between 
Fatah and the Popular Committees, for instance, and 29
it was in this period that the Islamic trend emerged, no 
longer tolerating suppression by Fatah supporters. 
  The General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) 
was represented at Kuwait University. GUPS had been 
wholly Fatah in orientation (not only because Fatah’s 
formative  body  came  from  Kuwait).  Nonetheless, 
a  student  group  formed  under  the  name  al-Haqq, 
which  included  Khalid  Mish`al,  tried  to  influence 
GUPS  concerning  the  impact  of  President  Sadat’s 
visit to Israel and the Lebanese civil war’s impact on 
Palestinians.57  The  students  saw  these  events  to  be 
crucial in that Israel was successfully forcing a wedge 
between the Palestinians and portions of their Arab 
support. Al-Haqq eventually went its own way as the 
Islamic  Association  of  Palestinian  Students.  Similar 
organizations  in  the  United  Kingdom  (UK)  and  the 
United States formed in the early 1980s. 
  Another important nucleus for HAMAS was at the 
Islamic University in Gaza, founded mostly by Ikhwan 
members associated with Shaykh Yasin’s al-Mujam`a 
al-Islami in 1978. The University, backed by Arafat, 
enabled the Ikhwan in mobilization as the institution 
educated  thousands  of  Palestinians  from  an  Islamic 
viewpoint. It became even more important with the 
outbreak of the First Intifadha. 
Points of Doctrine. 
  When HAMAS was established, it defined its mis-
sion as the liberation of Palestinians and cessation of 
Israeli aggression against them. That is to say, its goal 
is not the destruction of Israel,58 as is commonly as-
serted by the American and Israel media, and certainly 
HAMAS does not possess the military means to attain 
that goal. 
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  In February 1988, the Brotherhood granted formal 
recognition to HAMAS as a result of a key meeting 
in  Amman,  Jordan,  involving  the  spiritual  guide  of 
the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, Shaykh Abd al-
Rahman  al-Khalifa;  Ibrahim  Ghosheh,  the  HAMAS 
spokesperson and Jordanian representative; Mahmud 
Zahar, a surgeon; al-Rantisi, a West Bank representa-
tive; Jordanian parliament members; and the hospital 
director.  In  1988,  HAMAS  issued  its  now  infamous 
Charter,  which  it  no  longer  cites  or  refers  to.  This 
document condemns world Zionism and the efforts to 
isolate Palestine, and has been exhaustively discussed 
by scholar Andrea Nüsse along with HAMAS’ ideas 
as expressed in Filastin al-Muslima, a journal produced 
outside of the territories.59 Another important source of 
HAMAS’ positions and ideas is to be found in its bayanat 
(bayans or official announcements) which, unlike the 
journal,  come  from  within  the  occupied  territories 
and  illustrate  the  centrality  of  the  First  Intifadha  to 
the emerging HAMAS. Other earlier comprehensive 
presentations  of  HAMAS’  ideas  are  explained  in 
academic publications. Some of HAMAS’ earlier ideas 
which remain relevant have now undergone significant 
change or nuance. These are:
  •  HAMAS will bring about a return to the true 
Islam.  (This  implies  an  evolution  carried  out 
by  Islamists  rather  than  the  “return”  to  the 
past.)  However,  the  nationalist  struggle  for 
the fatherland (watan) is an integral part of the 
path toward the true Islam. An Islamic state in 
Palestine will be a victory for the entire Muslim 
ummah.60
  •  HAMAS is the true heir of the historic Islamist 
Shaykh Qassam movement because it is populist 31
(and militant), in contrast with the ineffective, 
compromising politics of the Palestinian elite.61
  •  Israel  was  entrenching  itself  and  its  land-
grabbing  policies  with  the  wave  of  Soviet 
immigration  that  brought  about  one  million 
new Jewish immigrants to Israel.62
  •  HAMAS, despite the claim of brotherhood in the 
nationalist  struggle,  disputed  the  PLO’s  right 
to  solely  represent  the  Palestinian  people.  It 
adopted an argument made by many, including 
Ziad  Abu  Amr,  that  indicts  the  hierarchical 
PLO  leadership  and  its  disconnect  with  the 
territories.63
  The Charter, which was the first written effort to 
express HAMAS’ goals, was issued in 1988 and has 
been  sharply  criticized  for  its  anti-Jewish  and  anti-
Zionist statements. It incorporates Hasan al-Banna’s 
statement that Israel would eventually be swept away 
(as other nations have risen and fallen before it). 
  Khalid  Mish`al,  the  current  leader  of  HAMAS, 
claims  that  the  Charter  “should  not  be  regarded  as 
the fundamental ideological frame of reference from 
which  the  movement  takes  its  positions.”64  And 
another important HAMAS leader, Ibrahim Ghosheh, 
has  explained  that  the  Charter  is  “not  sacred,”  its 
articles  are  “subject  to  review.”65  More  important 
than the Charter to our analysis might be the HAMAS 
document, “This is What We Struggle For,”66 or the 
document, The Islamic Resistance Movement issued in 
2000.67 
  The latter traces HAMAS’ history, expressing the 
view that the Palestinian people’s role, particularly a 
military role, is central to the struggle. In contrast, the 
role of Arab governments has decreased ever since the 32
defeat of their armies in 1967. The past experiences of 
the Ikhwan both in military and da`wa activities are 
outlined, along with the historical phases of HAMAS. 
The movement has rejected negotiation with Israel (in 
contrast to the PLO) and garnered opposition in the 
post-Oslo period as it retaliated against Israel for that 
country’s assassination of Yahya Ayash. Yet HAMAS 
has adapted strategically and politically. 
  Its defined enemy is the Zionist Project (not Jews), 
and it believes that liberation of Palestine depends on 
a Palestinian, Arab, and Islamic circle.68 That liberation 
will be accomplished by military means, but “civilian 
Zionists” are not targets, only “military Zionists” are. 
However, civilians might “inadvertently be hit or may 
be targeted only in retaliation for the enemy’s targeting 
of Palestinian civilians.”69 
  HAMAS  also  expressed  ambiguity  toward  the 
West generally, and the United States because of its 
unquestioning and seemingly unconditional support 
to  Israel.  For  some  years,  HAMAS’  journal  also 
included articles about Western fears of Islam (what 
is now called Islamophobia). These, they maintained, 
had arisen from a certain historical arrogance whereby 
the West rejected the idea that Islam formed the basis 
for Western civilization.70 At one time, it would not 
have been necessary to explain that Islamic civilization 
expressed  a  commitment  religiously  and  legally  to 
the monotheism shared with “the West” (Christianity 
and Judaism); political ideas of the perfect society and 
form of rule inspired by Plato; and that it was a well of 
synthesis, in which Hellenic, Byzantine, Arab, Persian, 
Indian, and other intellectual, cultural, artistic, scien-
tific, mathematical, and medical progress was made 
while Europe was in the “Dark Ages.” It was trans-
mitted “back” to the West in translations of the Arabic 33
works of Avicenna (Ibn Sina, who influenced St. Thomas 
Aquinas) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd). This idea, by the 
way, is not an Islamist eccentricity; the great historian 
Marshall Hodgson wrote that in conceptualizing world 
history, one could divide the world into four parts, and 
that Europe, or the West, and the Middle East were 
closest in their philosophical influences, monotheism, 
and culture (the Muslim scholars developed and gone 
beyond the Hellenic and Indic legacies).71 
  Islamists  have  long  accepted  the  principles  of 
the French Revolution,72 but view the West’s lack of 
support  for  democratization  where  Islamists  were 
strong, or prevailed as in Algeria, Egypt, and Palestine 
after  2006,  as  hypocritical.  HAMAS,  then  and  now, 
denies the clash of civilization thesis that became more 
well-known through Samuel Huntington, and also—
importantly—the  Al-Qa’idist  proposal  that  Muslims 
must wage jihad against the West. 
  HAMAS  has  also  been  accused  of  seeking  to 
impose  an  Islamic  order  in  which  Arab  Christians 
would  be  second-class  citizens,  as  would  women. 
Clashes concerning behavior, and what we could call 
a vigilante reaction by HAMAS cadres, did take place 
against bars and wine shops owned by Christians and, 
years previously, in attacks by youth on women not 
wearing hijab or when in April 2005 gunmen killed 
a  woman  in  her  fiance’s  car  and  beat  him,  which 
greatly “embarrased the HAMAS leadership,” which 
decried these incidents.73 These actions undercut the 
leadership’s position that it respected and protected 
women and minorities, its argument that Palestinian 
Christians are as poorly treated by Israelis as Palestinian 
Muslims,74 and that Palestinian unity is required. 
  By  2004,  lower-level  cadres’  fervor  against  bars 
and wine shops had been replaced with a policy of 34
actively  protecting  Christian  residents  of  Ramallah, 
and including them on HAMAS political lists.75 After 
HAMAS’ take-over  of Gaza, order was imposed on 
salafist groups who had more extreme views, like the 
Army of Islam. 
  With HAMAS’ electoral victory, media interest in 
Christian  and  women’s  reactions  was  kindled,  and 
showed that some prominent Palestinian Christians are 
justifiably uncomfortable with the historical concept 
of  the  ahl  al-dhimma,  the  protected  minorities  under 
an Islamic state,76 or with Islamist stances on public 
virtue and morality. But HAMAS’ constant assertion 
is that Islamic rule will not be forced on Palestinians.77 
Christians were supported by HAMAS in Ramallah, 
for example. And although the hijab is ubiquitous in 
Gaza,  some  women  claim  they  feel  secure  moving 
around without it. 
  The only woman in the HAMAS’ formed cabinet 
was,  predictably,  the  Minister  of  Women’s  Affairs, 
Myriam Saleh, who has stated: 
We assure all women that we will not force anybody to 
wear the hijab . . . we only present our ideas by suggestion 
and  with  good  intention.  The  majority  of  Palestinian 
women wear the hijab with full conviction and without 
coercion from anyone.78 
Much  more  could  be  said  about  the  competition 
between  HAMAS-sponsored  women’s  organizations 
and those that emerged from the other “secularist” or 
Left elements of the PLO. However, HAMAS and its 
female representatives have produced a more mature 
discourse as time has gone on,79 in a way not dissimilar 
to Hizbullah’s approach to women’s issues. 
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Relations with the PLO-Fatah and the Peace 
Processes.
  During  the  course  of  the  first  Intifadha,  more 
Palestinians than ever before severed ties with Israel 
to the degree that they could. This went along with 
a  call  for  self-sufficiency  as  with  “Intifadha  farms,” 
raising  produce,  chickens,  and  dairy  cows,  and 
boycotting  Israeli  products,  refusing  to  pay  taxes, 
and  in  merchants’  closing  of  their  stores.  HAMAS’ 
pragmatism in limiting some of these demands on the 
population was paralleled in its limited and calculated 
use of jihad. As the Madrid peace conference of 1991 
was held, HAMAS’ military  activity  increased. This 
reoccurred  when  Israelis  killed  Palestinian  civilians 
(the  circumstance  that  HAMAS  rationalizes  as  fard 
`ayn; that is, when jihad becomes a requisite individual 
duty) and when, to punish HAMAS for kidnapping and 
killing a border policemen, Israeli officials deported 
415 HAMAS and Islamic Jihad activists to  Lebanon 
in December 1992, including leaders like Abd al-Aziz 
Rantisi. 
  Israel had wanted to decrease HAMAS’ recruitment 
successes  within  the  prison  system  by  exiling  these 
prisoners,  and  it  hoped  to  do  so  permanently.  The 
move backfired, as it brought world attention to the 
violation of international law and the human rights 
of the activists, who were stranded on the southern 
Lebanese hillside of Marj al-Zuhur. There, instead of 
being isolated in Israeli prisons, they received visits   
from  journalists,  dignitaries,  and  Fatah  representa-
tives.80 The deportation also sparked HAMAS’ lead-
ers in Jordan to carry out attacks, and more activity 
centered in the West Bank. 36
  According  to  some,  the  deportation  followed  an 
agreement between HAMAS and Iran.81 The Iranians 
were  unhappy  with  Arafat’s  détente  with  Israel 
and had, in fact, attacked the PLO offices in Tehran. 
However, the degree of any Iranian relationship with 
HAMAS is greatly disputed. Israelis claim large-scale 
Iranian military and material support for HAMAS from 
Iran, but others point only to visits to Iran by HAMAS 
and expressions of solidarity.
Oslo. 
  When  the  news  of  the  Oslo  Agreements  broke, 
which essentially ended the first Intifadha, the situation 
became  much  more  difficult  for  HAMAS.  Their 
principles stated that the PLO could not any more claim 
to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people, 
and thus had no right to enter into negotiations with 
Israel without an indicator of the popular will. Further, 
they, like Khalid Mish‛al, hold that it is not up to Israel 
or the United States to force Palestinians to recognize 
and submit to occupation via a “recognition” of Israel 
which amounted to an acceptance of Zionism.82 HAMAS 
tried unsuccessfully to unify those opposed to Oslo 
and determined to continue its jihad. That meant both 
dissension and negotiation with the PLO as it took on 
the PA and was pressed by Israel to contain violence. 
  Over time, especially as the peace process faltered, 
there was increasing strife between Fatah and HAMAS. 
At  the  same  time,  ordinary  Palestinians  began  to 
support  HAMAS more strongly  as the  PA failed to 
provide substantive and positive gains to show for the 
trading of land and principles. 37
  By January 2006, HAMAS won a majority in the 
PA’s general legislative elections. This advent brought 
condemnation  from  Israel  and  ensued  in  a  power 
struggle carried out in several stages with PA President 
Mahmud Abbas and the Fatah party. The United States, 
which has included HAMAS on an official list of ter- 
rorist organizations for some years, and the European 
Union (EU) boycotted the PA even though HAMAS 
established a power-sharing government with Fatah 
by  accepting  Abbas’  presidency.  The  Palestinian 
population and government were cut off from much- 
needed funds and services like electricity which are 
paid and distributed through Israel. Meanwhile, vari-
ous Fatah leaders, like Muhammad Dahlan, were fund- 
ed  and  supported  to  engage  in  violence  against 
HAMAS.83  Restrictions  were  placed  on  travel  by 
HAMAS’ leaders like Isma‛il Haniya, who had toured 
Arab and world capitals and raised funds in the post-
election period. Haniya was forced to leave all the funds 
he had raised behind at the Egyptian border when he 
returned to Gaza. Israeli military attacks continued on 
Gaza, despite its status of “disengagement.” HAMAS 
had  to  confront  Dahlan,  this  force,  and  other  PA 
fighters, the government went without salaries, and 
the population was cut off from aid. 
  A media campaign that continues to the present 
was waged against HAMAS in the West and in the 
Israeli press. Israel’s hope was that the resulting chaos 
would reestablish Fatah’s control over leadership. But 
apparently more than media efforts were waged against 
HAMAS. It appears that a “soft coup” was planned, and 
that forces loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas were to 
be strengthened at the same time as HAMAS was to 
be weakened. News of this plan appeared in the Arab 
press at the end of April 2007 in a disputed document 38
implicating  a  faction  within  the  U.S.  administration 
and “Arabs (Egyptian and Jordanian)” who plotted to 
bolster Abbas to the detriment of HAMAS in the wake 
of the Mecca Agreement, forged between HAMAS and 
Fatah, and its breakdown.84 This supported the Arab 
view that the United States had opposed Saudi Arabia’s 
initiative taken to end fratricide between HAMAS and 
Fatah. 
  Finally, these events led to HAMAS’ decision to 
preempt  Dahlan’s  and  Abbas’  efforts,  in  which  it 
routed the Fatah forces in Gaza in battles fought on 
June 13-14, 2007. Battles also took place in the West 
Bank. Forgotten was the fact that HAMAS had been 
legitimately elected but had agreed to a national unity 
government. To punish them, Abbas “fired” HAMAS’ 
prime minister, declaring his intent to install a new 
(Fatah) government instead of the 3-month-old national 
unity government.85 The result was two governments, 
one HAMAS-run in Gaza, and the other under Abbas 
in the West Bank, although HAMAS is strong enough 
to challenge Fatah’s authority in the West Bank should 
it wish to do so. HAMAS’ position was that it would 
seek national unity despite the unfair policies against 
it. 
  Ziad Abu Amr explained the struggle in this way: 
“If you have two brothers, put them into a cage, and 
deprive them of basic essential needs for life; they will 
fight.”86  The  struggle  has  in  some  ways  simplified, 
but  in  other  ways  complicated,  Israel’s  approach  to 
HAMAS.  It  refuses  categorically  to  negotiate  with 
HAMAS  and  meets  exclusively  with  Abbas’  Fatah-
drawn government. But this situation cannot continue 
if there is to be any successful negotiation of the broader 
conflict. 39
Revolutionary Resistance vs. Overwhelming Force 
(Means).
  Israeli aircraft bombed the building where Ahmad 
Yasin was staying in September 2003, and 6 months later 
on March 22, 2004, an Israeli helicopter gunship fired 
air-to-ground Hellfire missiles at him as he was being 
wheeled out of an early morning prayer service, killing 
eight others, and injuring another dozen people. The 
international community condemned the assassination; 
however,  Ariel  Sharon  had  directly  approved  the 
orders to kill Yasin. Thousands protested;87 however, 
the  policy  of  targeted  killings  continued  with  al-
Rantisi’s death on April 17, 2004, and with the deaths 
of other HAMAS leaders. 
  Israeli  authorities  did  not  distinguish  between 
HAMAS’  carefully  separated  political  and  military 
wings, consequently many HAMAS moderates were 
killed or jailed along with those who could be caught 
in  the  secret  military  wing.  However,  it  was  well-
known that the political and military wings of HAMAS 
had long since been separated and were sufficiently 
independent of each other as to adopt very different 
political positions. For example, they clashed over the 
benefit of political participation when the opportunity 
first presented itself in 1996, and some HAMAS figures 
ran as independents.88
  HAMAS’ use of violence is its response to what it 
sees as state terror on the part of Israel. For that reason, 
it allowed attacks on Israeli military, but not on civilians 
in acts of revenge. This principle fell apart with the 
advent of suicide bombings, often an individual, self-
recruited action. HAMAS has disallowed such actions 
during truces, although some other Palestinian groups 
have enacted them. 40
  In summary, what is needed is to alter both the 
means employed and the ends sought of both sides in 
the conflict. 
Ends. 
  Neither Israel nor the Palestinians have a unified 
position towards the other. Each group is socialized 
in  particular  ways,  through  the  educational  system, 
employment  experiences;  and  for  Israelis,  in  the 
military, in political parties, families, and bureaucracies. 
To understand the divergent views of the conflict and 
how each “side” views its goals or ends, one must look 
more deeply within the two communities. 
  According to Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling, 
Israelis  had  an  image  of  themselves  as  a  unified 
society under an earlier Zionist self-sacrificing, land-
working vision. This vision is no longer accurate, and 
today he describes seven cultures, all of which have 
been impacted by the increasing role of religion and 
militarism. These seven cultures are: “the previously 
hegemonic secular Askhenazi upper middle class, the 
national religious [ultra-religious who are nationalists], 
the traditionalist Mizrahim (Orientals) [meaning Jews 
from  the  broader  Middle  East,  Central  Asia,  India], 
the Orthodox religious, the Arabs, the new Russian 
immigrants, and the Ethiopians.”89 A cultural code of 
Jewishness  (ranging  from  very  devout  to  aetheistic) 
and a nonsecular system are the only commonality for 
six of these groupings, and there are distinct limits to 
Israel’s democracy as Arabs have no real legitimacy 
in  this  schema.  Security,  Kimmerling  contends, 
has  become  a  civil  religion  in  Israel,  signaling  the 
subordination of the nonmilitary to the military. And 
within the six Jewish cultures, he sees three different 41
orientations  to  the  “enemy”  (Arabs  and  Muslims), 
these being securitist (bitchonist), conflict-oriented, and 
compromise or peace-oriented.90 
  The securitist view is that Israel would be doomed 
by  a  major  military  defeat.  The  state  owes  the 
Israeli people security from this fate. Both war- and 
peacemaking are functions belonging to the military, 
according to this way of thinking. The conflict-oriented 
(who differ slightly from the bitchonistim) aim to retain 
as much land as possible of historic/Biblical Israel for 
moral and religious, and not just security reasons. These 
groups include those who want a complete elimination 
of a Palestinian threat, whether by permanent conquest 
and  deportation,  relocation,  or  other  dispersal  of 
Palestinians living where, in their view, Jews should 
live.  But  securitists  also  include  those  who  can 
conceive of a PA which accepts Israel’s security needs. 
To both securitists and the conflict-oriented, “security” 
refers to demographic challenge as much as violence. 
Compromise-oriented  Israelis  see  that  a  peace  in 
which Israel was accepted in the region would provide 
security.  Hence,  Israel’s  desired  end-state(s):  free  of 
enemies,  free  of  non-Jews,  democratic  yet  halakhic 
(following Jewish law) are all but unachievable, and 
are disputed between the three security orientations 
that cut across its polyglot culture. Of the three, it is 
the compromise-oriented who are most willing to, or 
who have already called for, dialogue with HAMAS.
  All of this means that the Israeli security culture 
is not exactly like that in the United States, nor is the 
Palestinian “security culture” if we can hypothesize 
one under occupation, and without sovereignty. When 
the  United  States  seemingly  borrows  from  Israeli 
military and counterterrorist policies, as it has been 
accused of doing in Iraq,91 there are nevertheless certain 42
qualitatively different assumptions that hold, even if the 
defensive framework (a defense against global terror) 
takes shape in policies that break with, for instance, 
the notion of “clean arms” or not attacking civilians.92 
Mira Sucharov has shown how Israel has developed a 
defensive security ethic (part of its security culture) but 
continuously pursued an offensive security doctrine.93 
If this is not a paradox, then it may not be so difficult 
to perceive HAMAS’ intention of defending Muslims, 
through the means of jihad if necessary, even though 
this  is  not  a  symmetrical  struggle  or  exact  mirror 
image. 
  HAMAS’  goal  is  the  liberation  of  Palestine  (not 
destruction of the Jews), and its “frame of reference” 
is Islam.94 HAMAS does aim to create a more Islamic 
society, but that goal is subordinate to its nationalist 
or  political  agenda.  Its  leaders  have  differentiated 
the creation of an Islamic society from the goal of an 
Islamic state,95 since they state it lacks the means to do 
so, and must ascertain the will of the people.
  It appeals to various segments of Palestinian society 
which is also polyglot, riven by its division between 
those who remained in their original homes, or fled 
within Palestine, and refugees. The refugees outside of 
the West Bank and Syria comprise a very large number, 
have supported both the trends of armed conflict and 
negotiation, and live in varying circumstances. They 
are treated as citizens in Jordan, but not in Lebanon or 
Syria. HAMAS has refused to exclude them from the 
issue, as was essentially forced on other Palestinians 
attempting to negotiate with Israel. Within Gaza and 
West Bank, the camp issue and developmental needs 
of society mean greater public support for whatever 
political  entity  appears  most  effective,  which  has 
been HAMAS in recent years. As with Israelis, each 43
sector  of  society—professionals,  workers,  camp 
refugees, students, members of the historic elites, and 
unemployed  or  underemployed  youth—are  divided 
in  their  views  about  their  historical  experience  and 
future. Individuals’ life-histories reveal that many of 
the young men involved in militance since the Second 
Intifadha are torn between what they see as the primacy 
of  the  conflict  and  normal  desires  for  stability  and 
their family needs.96 Among youth, there is a distinct 
difference between Israelis who live with, it is true, 
an  existential  threat  imparted  through  their  society, 
and high school and military training, but who do not 
live, as Palestinian youth often do, in such a stressful 
state of emergency.97 Stories of those Palestinians so 
traumatized that they cannot leave their apartments 
or homes are not limited only to HAMAS’ members 
or their families. Palestinians’ frequent imprisonment 
places a lot of stress on families. 
  One al-Aqsa commander I interviewed had been 
fighting since the age of 13. He was on the run, eluding 
PA  security  who  had  tortured  and  imprisoned  his 
men, and he spoke to me of the brevity of his visits 
with his wife who, along with her family members, is 
hearing-impaired, and he would like to find software to 
help her.98 In fact, HAMAS provided aid to numerous 
female family members during the chaotic and corrupt 
2004-05 period, when women were harassed when they 
came to collect prisoners’ stipends from PA officials. 
  One can point to diverse “hard-liners” who think 
that  militaristic  Israel  can  only  understand  force. 
Alongside them are professionals and others who have 
tried to use the new global connectivity—the media, 
internet, messaging—to their advantage, and believe 
in negotiation but who are worn down by the endless 
cycles of negotiating and dialoging that seem never to 
erode Israeli inflexibility and paranoia. For Palestinians, 44
their  Arab,  Muslim,  and  Palestinian  identities  all 
carry  negative  weight  and  instant  stereotyping  in 
any interaction with Israel. The Arab and Palestinian 
parts of their identities were recovered and honored 
through  political  activism.  HAMAS  has  allowed 
them to express their Muslim identity as well. Being 
outside the fractious pro- and anti-Arafatist struggle, 
the  socialist-Arab,  or  Arab-nationalist  versus  others 
dynamic, and the conflict between Tunisian returnees 
versus Territory-based operatives of Fatah, also lent 
credence to HAMAS, whose leaders have earned their 
reputation for decency, practicality, and hard work in 
public service. 
Recognition.
  It is frequently stated that Israel or the United States 
cannot “meet” with HAMAS (although meeting is not 
illegal; materially aiding terrorism is, if proven) because 
the latter will not “recognize Israel.” In contrast, the 
PLO has “recognized” Israel’s right to exist and agreed 
in principle to bargain for significantly less land than 
the  entire  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip,  and  it  is  not 
clear that Israel has ever agreed to accept a Palestinian 
state. The recognition of Israel did not bring an end to 
violence, as wings of various factions of the PLO did 
fight Israelis, especially at the height of the Second (al-
Aqsa) Intifadha. 
  Recognition of Israel by HAMAS, in the way that 
it is described in the Western media, cannot serve as a 
formula for peace. HAMAS moderates have, however, 
signaled that it implicitly recognizes Israel, and that 
even  a  tahdiya  (calming,  minor  truce)  or  a  hudna,  a 
longer-term  truce,  obviously  implies  recognition.99 
Khalid  Mish`al  states,  “We  are  realists,”  and  there 
“is  an  entity  called  Israel,”  but  “realism  does  not 45
mean that you have to recognize the legitimacy of the 
occupation.”100 
  The  issue  is  fraught  with  tension  for  HAMAS. 
Tension came to the fore when observers interpreted 
HAMAS’  participation  and  signing  of  the  so-called 
Prisoner’s Document (National Conciliation Document of 
the Prisoners) in 2006 (second version June 28, 2006),101 
which  suggests  just  this  implicit  interpretation  of 
recognition of Israel. Due to that popular perception, 
HAMAS removed its signature; however, the document 
has been the basis of various sets of negotiations, as in 
Qatari Shaykh Hamad’s 2006 initiative. 
Two States. 
  HAMAS has come to accept a two-state vision, even 
with the contradiction in terms between this aim and 
the rights of historic Palestine. Mish‛al was asked, 
Do you accept a solution based on two states, an Israeli 
and a Palestinian, according to President George Bush’s 
vision?
[Mish’al]  As  a  Palestinian,  I  am  concerned  with  the 
establishment of a Palestinian state and not concerned 
with the occupation state. Why is the Palestinian being 
asked and the establishment of two states becomes one 
of his objectives and principles? The Zionist state exists. 
I am talking about my absent Palestinian state. I was the 
one deprived of my state, sovereignty, independence, 
freedom and self-determination. Therefore we ought to 
concentrate on how to achieve our rights. I am concerned 
with the establishment of my state.
[Humaydi  (interviewer)]  Do  you  agree  with  Prime 
Minister Isma’il Haniyah’s remarks: A Palestinian state 
within the 1967 territories and a truce?46
[Mish’al] This is a stand in the movement and it was 
adopted inside it. The movement accepts a state within 
the 1967 borders and a truce.102
Mistakes.
  Excesses in attacks, particularly suicide attacks, on 
civilians are not acknowledged as crimes or tactical 
errors by HAMAS, but it is defensive when discussing 
this issue even when the “martyrs” are not HAMAS 
members.  I  have  suggested  in  this  monograph  that 
HAMAS’ use of violence, and potential relinquishing 
of violence, is best analyzed at the level of the group, or 
social movement, and not at the level of the individual. 
However,  much  of  the  literature  on  radicalization 
and  deradicalization  published  since  9/11  provides 
analysis at the individual level. In the Palestinian case, 
some proffer the most negative insights on repression 
in Arab society which is supposed to produce violence, 
and  that  the  glorification  of  the  martyr  is  a  part  of 
ongoing Arab and Palestinian socialization. All of this 
may be true, but it does not deal with either the facts 
of occupation which result in direct harm, and human 
and material loss to Palestinians. Nor does this analysis 
help us understand the tactical use of violence, and 
how it can either decrease or increase. 
  Because  they  contradicted  HAMAS’  creed  of 
Palestinian brotherhood, excesses in the fighting with 
Fatah and revenge activities, especially by lower level 
cadres in Gaza, were hard for HAMAS to live down, 
yet seemed to be fairly unavoidable, given the specific 
factionalization and identification of the strong Gaza 
clans.103  Older  securalists,  various  sectors  of  Arab 
Israelis, and those committed to any one of the other 47
four parties of the PLO are not necessarily comfortable 
with HAMAS’ dominance or vision, but can envision 
compromise, in which each respects the limitations of 
the other.104 
HAMAS and Arab Political Currents. 
  The  Ikhwan  (Muslim  Brotherhood)  as  a  broader 
movement had garnered a great deal of support by 
championing  the  Palestinian  cause,  fighting  in  1948 
against  Israel.  But  later,  as  the  Ikhwan  of  Palestine 
turned  towards  missionary  activity  and  away  from 
armed resistance, it was the militant PLO that captured 
popular imagination and allegiances. 
  HAMAS turned the Ikhwan’s survival equation on 
its head, asserting that the liberation of Palestine is an 
essential task for the ummah, or Muslim community, 
that rather than waiting for an Islamic society. Enacting 
the liberation of Palestine will bring about an Islamic 
way of life. Through this evolution, a certain amount of 
inter-Ikhwan and Ikhwan-HAMAS tensions emerged, 
especially  in  Jordan.  These  may  take  a  new  form, 
particularly if HAMAS begins negotiations with Israel 
which would possibly force a shift in the Brotherhood’s 
position  toward  Israel,  thus  impacting  Egypt  and 
Jordan. 
  HAMAS’  relations  vis-à-vis  the  more  secular 
nationalist  movement  also  represents  a  dynamic 
forged over time. The PLO was eventually composed 
of three “progressive” groups, the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Communist 
Party, along with the much larger organization, Fatah. 
Since all of Fatah’s founders with the exception of Yasir 
Arafat had been members of the Ikhwan, Islamism was 48
reflected in Fatah and appears in some of the discourse 
of the al-Aqsa Brigades which emerged from it. 
  Israel’s decision to counter the results of the 2006 
Palestinian election by boycotting HAMAS, withhold-
ing funds to the PA, and encouraging Mahmud Abbas 
to create his own nonelected government, have been 
described as a choice to support a “secular nationalist” 
movement  as  opposed  to  an  Islamist  nationalist 
movement  which  would  not  recognize  Israel  in  the 
style demanded by that state. Supporting secularists 
versus Islamists is not the key to the issue. After all, 
Israel denied recognition of the PLO for years, likewise 
treating it as a terrorist movement. 
  The issue is the fundamentally altered relationship 
between the stronger Israel and the weak PA, given 
the PA’s acceptance of negotiations and recognition of 
Israel through the Oslo process through which Israel 
thought  it  had  solved  its  “internal  Arab”  dilemma. 
That change was threatened by both Intifadhas and 
then by HAMAS. HAMAS’ transition from violence to 
political participation to a desire for negotiation really 
demonstrates a similar pattern, but HAMAS is holding 
back from formal recognition of Israel on the grounds 
that it must represent Palestinian popular will (or the 
will of its constituents). 
  Israel’s  interaction  with  HAMAS  is  an  excellent 
example of the various lessons of asymmetric conflict 
that are highly instructive in the broader Middle East. 
The current situation is also a reflection of weaknesses 
or  failings  within  Palestinian  politics  and  society 
that include the aim of the PLO to serve as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people, when, in fact, 
no party or government can ever maintain itself in such 
a hegemonic position indefinitely. 49
HAMAS’ Troubles with Jordan.
  HAMAS has had a mixed experience in Jordan which 
reflects the jockeying of Palestinian versus Jordanian 
interests and changes over time. In September 1997, 
four Israeli MOSSAD agents attempted to assassinate 
Khalid Mish`al, HAMAS’ spokesman in Jordan, with 
electronically-delivered poison.105 He was taken to the   
hospital, and when King Husayn was informed of the 
attack, he asked President Bill Clinton to force Israel 
to reveal the nature of the poison, and brought in a 
specialist from the Mayo Clinic. Husayn was infuriated 
by Israel’s assumption that it could act freely in Jordan, 
despite (or possibly because of) the peace treaty, so he 
then called for the release of Ahmad Yasin.106 
  Since  King  Husayn’s  1999  death,  it  is  assumed 
that  more  American  and  Israeli  pressure  has  been 
brought to bear on King Abdullah, his successor. The 
GID in Jordan waited for HAMAS officials to leave 
the country, as they knew the officials were to visit the 
Islamic Republic of Iran in 1999, and then raided and 
closed their offices and the offices of their publication 
and issued charges against them. Other leaders were 
forced  underground.  The  Jordanian  Ikhwan  were 
divided as to the proper response, preferring not to 
have  a  break  with  the  government.107  This  forced  a 
transfer of HAMAS officials to Syria, including those 
who have taken more moderate positions on certain 
issues. 
  When Ibrahim Ghosheh left Qatar where he was in 
exile in 2001 and returned to Jordan, he was ordered 
to “freeze” his status in HAMAS and, if he did so, he 
could visit the Kingdom.108 The Jordanians postponed 
an  official  visit  by  Mahmoud  Zahar  in  April  2006 
after the discovery of a weapons cache attributed to 50
HAMAS,109 which included Iranian-made Katyushas. 
Whereas  Mahmoud  Abbas  accepted  the  Jordanian 
claims,  HAMAS  rejected  them  and  saw  Jordan  as 
playing into the Israeli-inspired dispute with Fatah. 
HAMAS’ defense was that it has never been interested 
in fighting any battles (with other Arab entities) but 
only for Palestine. 
HAMAS in Syria. 
  Syria has hosted Palestinian groups since 1967, and 
at  times  encouraged  tensions  with  the  mainstream 
of  the  PLO  through  its  sponsorship  of  particular 
factions, its own Palestinian forces, and various forms 
of interference. Syrian and Palestinian actors in Syria 
were  involved  in  the  rebellion  against  Yasir  Arafat, 
and  the  two  factions  conducted  operations  against 
each  other  though  tensions  have  risen  and  waned. 
The Syrians were furious with Arafat when the Oslo 
Accords were announced. HAMAS, as well as Islamic 
Jihad,  have  offices  in  Damascus,  publish  there,  and 
reportedly conduct training and planning there. 
  Khalid  Mish‛al  (the  unofficial  leader  of  HAMAS 
today) and Musa Abu Marzuq (the deputy political 
leader) are located in Syria due to the practical need to 
maintain leadership “outside” of Palestinian territory 
and in light of changed circumstances in Jordan. Peri-
odically U.S. statements appear indicating that Syria 
will have to rein in its support of “terrorist movements” 
to qualify for participation in peace negotiations with 
Israel—this message was conveyed by Speaker of the 
House Nancy Pelosi—or to be treated more cordially 
by  the  United  States.  Former  U.S.  President  Jimmy 
Carter  met  with  Marzuq,  Mish‛al,  and  Muhammad 
Nazzal for more than 4 hours in Damascus on April 18, 51
2008, and Carter urged that peace talks include both 
HAMAS and Syria.110
  In  June  2008,  Syria’s  foreign  minister,  Walid 
Muellem,  announced  his  country’s  support  for  the 
truce  between  HAMAS  and  Israel.111  Despite  the 
current  excitement  over  a  possible  Israeli-Syrian 
détente and Syria’s strong interest in recovering the 
Golan Heights, HAMAS officials were certain that the 
Syrian government would not abandon it, not even to 
clinch a peace deal, said Khalid Mish‛al.112 Bouthaina 
Shaaban,  the  Syrian  Expatriate  Minister,  confirmed 
Syria’s position that it will not abandon Hizbullah or 
HAMAS, and that such a demand in return for peace 
negotiations is like “asking the United States to shake 
off Israel.”113
HAMAS and Saudi Arabia. 
  HAMAS receives a certain amount of support from 
Saudi  Arabia.  The  United  States  has  criticized  the 
Kingdom for doing so, and in March 2006, a HAMAS 
delegation visited Riyadh where the Saudis made it 
clear that they attached no preconditions to support 
for the new government, and their aid to the poverty-
stricken  Palestinians  is  “humanitarian  assistance.”114 
Saudi funds were delivered to Palestinians by the Saudi 
Committee for the Support of the Al Quds Intifadha 
from  2000  to  about  2006,  thereafter  by  the  Saudi 
Committee for the Relief of the Palestinian People, and 
will thereafter be under a monitored commission. The 
Committee partners with United Nations (UN) agencies 
such as the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization  (UNESCO)  to  provide  scholarships, 
and  the  government  recently  promised  funds  to 
rebuild destroyed homes in Gaza and the West Bank. 52
HAMAS is likewise very concerned about its effective 
community and charitable efforts, and the attacks on 
these institutions in the West Bank115 from August into 
September 2008 must concern Saudi Arabia. 
Practicing Religion. 
  HAMAS’  Islamist  orientation  is  alive  to  the 
challenges  Palestinians  faced  as  Muslims.  They  lost 
control over their system of religious education and 
the appointment of clerics (which fell to Israel, Egypt, 
and  Jordan).  They  could  not  visit  numerous  holy 
places,  mosques,  and  tombs,  many  of  which  were 
closed. Palestinians in one area are blocked from travel 
to another, thereby preventing visits to religious sites 
or  persons.  They  could  not  travel  within  the  Arab 
world via Israel, and Palestinians who live in Israel are 
essentially cut off from the Arab world, except in very 
recent years when it is far easier for certain categories 
of Palestinians to travel to Jordan. 
  Palestinians  have  historically  faced  obstacles  in 
performing the hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca, one of the 
five  basic  requirements  of  Muslims.  In  2002  Israel 
prevented  all  Palestinians  under  35  from  going  on 
hajj. In November 2003, a large number of Palestinians 
(including women and elderly persons) were denied 
permission to go on the ‛umrah (the lesser pilgrimage) 
during  Ramadan.  In  August  2007,  3,000  pilgrims 
were  stranded  at  the  crossing  into  Egypt.  In  late 
December  2007,  over  a  thousand  persons  were  not 
allowed entrance back into Gaza from Egypt. Egypt 
had allowed them into to its territory to perform hajj, 
but Israel had closed the border to punish HAMAS 
and, despite its promotion of Mahmoud Abbas, gave 
him no authority to solve the problem. This created 53
a  diplomatic  headache  for  Egypt  as  Israeli  Foreign 
Minister Tizpi Livni took Egyptians to task.116 
  Israel arrested certain Palestinian pilgrims, namely 
those thought to be HAMAS members, when reenter-
ing, which further illustrates their lack of sovereignty 
and Israel’s willingness to embarrass Egypt and force it 
to pressure HAMAS by calling attention to the matters 
of the Gazan-Egyptian tunnels, Gilad Shalit, and other 
issues. 
  These  problems—like  the  closure  of  mosques  or 
blocking  of  Palestinian  visitation  to  the  Haram  al-
Sharif in Jerusalem in addition to summary detentions, 
individual and collective punishments, such as home-
razings—fund the Muslim claim that Palestinians are 
being denied the rights to ordinary life and to practice 
their religion. This, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the extremely 
popular  Egyptian  preacher  watched  avidly  on  Al-
Jazeera, asserts is the reason that they may participate 
in  individual  or  defensive  jihad,  which  had  been 
expressed  through  suicide  attacks  and  other  armed 
actions. 
Political and Military Structure. 
  HAMAS  is  headed  by  a  political  bureau  with 
representatives  for  military  affairs,  foreign  affairs, 
finance,  propaganda,  and  internal  security.  An 
Advisory  Council,  or  Majlis  al-Shura,  is  linked  to 
the  political  bureau,  which  is  also  connected  with 
all  Palestinian  communities,  to  HAMAS’  social  and 
charitable groups, HAMAS’ elected members, district 
committees, and the leadership in Israeli prisons. 
  Major  attacks  against  Israel  have  been  carried 
out by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Squads of HAMAS. 54
They also developed the Qassam rocket used to attack 
Israeli  settlements  and  towns  in  the  Negev  desert. 
However, much of HAMAS’ activity during the First 
Intifadha  consisted  of  its  participation  within  more 
broadly-based  popular  demonstrations  and  locally 
coordinated efforts at resistance, or countering Israeli 
raids, enforcing opening of businesses, and the like.
  HAMAS  protested  the  autonomy  agreement 
between the Israelis and the PLO in Jericho and the 
Gaza Strip as too limited a gain. This put it into a more 
direct type of political confrontation with the PLO, and 
by the time of the first elections for the PA’s Council in 
1996, HAMAS was caught in a dilemma. It had gained 
popularity as a resistance organization, but the entire 
trajectory of PLO activities in Oslo 1 and Oslo 2 (the 
Taba Accord of September 28, 1995) were meant to end 
the Intifadha. The elections would further strengthen 
the PLO. However, if HAMAS boycotted the elections 
and most people voted, then it would be even more 
isolated. HAMAS’ leadership rejected participation in 
those elections but without ruling it out in the future, 
and this gave the organization the ability to continue 
protesting  Oslo  and  build  up  its  political  support. 
HAMAS  presence  in  the  universities,  high  schools, 
and professional groupings were important to it, and it 
even established women’s organizations which rivaled 
and  challenged  the  positions  of  Palestinian  feminist 
groups in this era.117 
  When  suicide  attacks  were  launched  to  protest   
Israeli  violence  against  Palestinians,  HAMAS  was 
blamed for inspiring or organizing the suicide bombers, 
whether or not its own operatives or those of the more 
radical Islamic Jihad were involved. In fact, HAMAS 
observed  a  3-year  moratorium  on  suicide  attacks, 
which was then reestablished for a year, and possibly 55
broken in a January 2008 attack in Dimona which may 
have been carried out by HAMAS or by other actors. 
  Suicide attacks are a terrorist tactic that multiplies 
the impact of a smaller force in an asymmetric struggle. 
They were first employed by the Tamil Tigers in Sri 
Lanka  in  the  contemporary  period,  then  in  Syria 
against  Syrian  government  targets,  and  in  Lebanon 
against Israeli targets, and have spread in recent years 
to  Iraq,  Afghanistan,  Jordan,  Egypt,  and  Palestine 
although they were not a typical form of attack prior to 
this period, as suicide is not allowed in Islam. HAMAS 
operatives first utilized suicide attacks in 1994, after an 
American-born Israeli settler, Baruch Goldstein, fired 
on and threw hand grenades at unarmed worshippers 
in  the  al-Haram  al-Ibrahimi  mosque  in  Hebron  on 
February 25, killing 29.118 It was thought that Goldstein 
had attained entry with assistance of Israeli troops. Until 
that date, HAMAS’ only targets were Israeli military. 
It ceased such attacks, which were very controversial 
with  other  Palestinians  in  1995,  and  reintroduced 
them  after  the  “targeted  killing”  of  HAMAS  leader 
Yahya Ayyash. Israeli sources aggrandized the themes 
of  martyrdom  to  be  found  in  Islamic  history,  and 
blamed much of contemporary Islamic radicalism and 
Palestinian psychology with its “culture of death.” 
  HAMAS’  leaders  are  defensive  about  the  tactic, 
even though Palestinians appeared to support its use. 
The Norwegian group, Fafo, found that 69 percent of 
those Palestinians polled in 2005 agreed that attacks on 
Israeli targets where legitimate responses to the political 
situation.  Thus  it  is  clear  that  ordinary  Palestinians 
see  these  attacks  as  being  strategic,  although  they 
additionally  expressed  desperation.119  HAMAS,  like 
other Palestinian groups, argue that Israel has killed 
many more Palestinians than the other way around, 56
and statistics show this to be true. From December 1987 
to April 2006, Israel killed 5,050 Palestinians whereas 
Palestinians  killed  1,426  Israelis.120  It  is  clear  that 
Israelis of lower economic means are more vulnerable 
to  suicide  attacks  as  these  have  frequently  targeted 
buses. 
  Declarations  of  a  tahdiya  (calming)  arranged 
by  Alastair  Crooke  to  end  such  attacks  were  made 
in  2002  and  2003.  Crooke  was  the  former  Security 
Advisor to Javier Solana, the European Union High 
Representative.  Crooke  now  heads  Conflict  Forum 
which advocates negotiating with HAMAS. Another 
tahdiya was held from March 2005, but the first two 
were  broken  when  Israelis  assassinated  HAMAS 
leaders. Under the current truce, no attacks are being 
launched by HAMAS on Israel. 
  A  hudna,  or  longer-term  truce,  (first  offered  by 
Shaykh  Yasin)  would  be  more  encompassing  and 
is  conditional  on  cessation  of  attacks  on  civilians,  a 
stop to settlement activities, and withdrawal from the 
Occupied Territories (the West Bank and Gaza). 
Zakat and Community.
  HAMAS’  extensive  array  of  social  services  are 
aimed at ameliorating the plight of the Palestinians. 
It provides funding for hospitals, schools, mosques, 
orphanages, food distribution, and aid to the families 
of Palestinian prisoners who, numbering more than 
10,000 in these years, constituted an important political 
force. Given the PA’s frequent inability to provide for 
such needs, HAMAS stepped into the breach.
  Until  its  electoral  triumph  in  January  2006, 
HAMAS received funding from a number of sources. 
Palestinians living abroad provided money, as did a 57
number of private donors in the wealthy Arab oil states 
such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, as well as 
those  in  the  West.  Much  aid  directed  to  renovation 
of the Palestinian territories was badly needed, but, 
unfortunately,  a  great  deal  of  that  rebuilding  was 
destroyed in the Israeli campaign in the West Bank 
in 2002, which, in turn, was intended to combat the 
suicide bombings and the al-Agsa Intifadha.
  Over the years the IDF has carried out “targeted 
eliminations” of a number of HAMAS leaders. These 
include Shaykh Yasin (March 22, 2004); Salah Shihada 
(July 23, 2002); Dr. Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi (April 17, 
2004);  Dr.  Ibrahim  Al-Makadma  (August  3,  2003); 
and Isma`il Abu Shanab (August 21, 2003). HAMAS 
has  had  to  develop  a  capacity  to  replace  leaders 
who were killed by Israel, and to recover damage to 
the  organization.  Beyond  the  previously  mentioned 
HAMAS activities in Jordan and Syria, there also has 
been HAMAS activity in Palestinian refugee camps in 
Lebanon.
  When United States cut off $420 million and the 
EU cut off $600 million in aid to the PA’s HAMAS-led 
government, ordinary Palestinians experienced grave 
difficulties;  food,  medical  supplies,  gasoline,  and 
energy were all impacted. Gaza had been impacted 
by poverty and high unemployment, with about 87.7 
percent of all households living in income poverty by 
mid-2006, and about 61.5 percent said then that they 
lacked money for daily needs.121
  To prevent total collapse, the United States and the 
EU promised relief funds, but these were hampered for 
a lengthy period. Gazans wrote about their difficulties; 
and the decision was made to risk blowing up in cabs 
running on cooking oil or simply to walk and to try to 
run aid activities without supplies or simply leave. 58
  The latest attacks on charitable organizations in the 
West Bank must cease but that depends on an inter-
Palestinian negotiation. 
Hostages. 
  On March 12, 2007, the Army of Islam, a group with 
an al-Qa’ida-like orientation, under the protection of 
the Gazan Daghmush clan, kidnapped Scottish BBC 
correspondent Alan Johnston. They held him for 114 
days, apparently thinking that Britain would agree to 
a trade for imprisoned leader Abu Qatada. HAMAS 
arranged Johnston’s release after he was handed over 
to them in July.122 
  On July 25, 2006, IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit was 
captured by fighters who were variously announced 
as being from the Islamic Army, or fighters from that 
group, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and an umbrella 
group including HAMAS. HAMAS obtained custody 
of Shalit and could negotiate his release, but wanted 
concessions for doing so, namely a prisoner exchange 
and  probably  an  opening  to  the  Rafah  border. 
Negotiations took place after the truce began, but stalled 
even though a prisoner exchange with Hizbullah was 
concluded. At the time of this writing, senior HAMAS 
official  Ahmed  Yousef  had  announced  that  there 
would be a prisoner exchange for Shalit by the end of 
Ramadan on October 1, 2008, possibly involving the 
return of HAMAS leaders from Syria to Gaza. 
HAMAS’ Threat Value. 
  Security analysts frequently exaggerate the threat 
of political organizations. What is the true threat of 59
HAMAS? Its forces were estimated in Gaza at only 
5,000 to 6,000 fighters, which were just a fraction of the 
168,000 of the IDF. In the summer of 2007, HAMAS 
vowed to double its numbers to 12,000. It may now 
be closer to 10,000 fighters, or other security analysts’ 
figures of 15,000 fighters. In other words, we cannot 
accurately gauge its threat, except to say it is a much 
smaller  force  than  the  mighty  IDF,  even  though  its 
capacity goes beyond conventional fighting to small 
numbers who can engage in terrorist attacks. The Fatah 
Presidential Guard under Abbas numbered only about 
3,700, and Abbas hoped to expand this by 1,000 with 
$86 million promised by the U.S. Government. That 
the Bush administration would provide $86 million to 
strengthen security forces loyal to Abbas, was reported 
in the world press.123 
  In March 2005, Shaul Mofaz accused HAMAS of 
obtaining  Strela  (SA-7)  shoulder-fired  anti-aircraft 
missiles.124  Charges  that  HAMAS  is  gaining  and 
stockpiling  weapons  in  Gaza,  including  anti-aircraft 
missiles, are periodically reprinted in the Israeli press, 
with no ascertainable accuracy. However, the Qassam 
rockets that fell periodically on Sderot and surrounding 
Negev towns were real. Some American analysts also 
support the idea of an Israel reconquest of Gaza, with 
the justification that the group was building its strength 
and weapons capacity.125 This argument makes sense 
only if one would also call for a new Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon, or for requiring an action by a UN force 
to disarm Hizbullah. None of these actions will lead 
to peace or security, and will not result in an end to 
HAMAS or Hizbullah.
  The PA was authorized to have a police force and 
not an army. The dysfunctionality of that force stems 
from the PA’s lack of sovereignty and the absence of 60
a political solution with Israel, as much as technical 
deficiencies or problems of corruption.126
  A  future  compromise  will  have  to  address 
Palestinian  sovereignty.  If  Israel  can  never  accept  a 
Palestinian army but expects Palestinian self-policing 
to provide Israel security, one can only expect a large 
force  that  will  be  an  employer  to  the  many  young 
men who have known nothing but armed resistance 
to  Israel—as  in,  for  example,  the  al-Aqsa  Martyr’s 
Brigades,  which  have  operated  under  independent 
leadership varying by city or town. 
HAMAS, the West, and the United States. 
    HAMAS  shares  an  acceptance  of  the  scientific 
rational traditions of the West along with moderate 
Islamist  groups  like  the  Muslim  Brotherhood. 
(The  fact  that  both  groups  are  castigated  as  highly 
“fundamentalist”  and  Taliban-like  is  a  great  irritant 
to  HAMAS.)  HAMAS  accepts  the  legitimacy  of  the 
nation-state, as opposed to bin Ladin and Zawahiri’s 
emphasis on the Islamic nation. The Western training 
or Western-style education of most HAMAS leaders 
has much to do with the organization’s stances.127
  The United States had not initially labeled HAMAS 
a terrorist organization. The State Department acknowl-
edged  meetings  with  HAMAS  representatives  until 
March 1993128 when Israelis protested. It was aware of 
Palestinians  worldwide,  who  were  either  associated 
with  the  Ikhwan,  or  later,  HAMAS.  Palestinian 
organizations  that  were  part  of  the  PLO  like  the 
PFLP  remained  on  the  terrorist  list,  but  practically 
speaking,  the  secular  nationalist  Palestinian  groups 
were  legitimated  after  Oslo  despite  certain  factions’ 
rejection  of  Oslo.  HAMAS,  which  rejected  Oslo  but 61
took a neutral stance toward the PA at the time, was 
increasingly treated as a dangerous terrorist threat in 
U.S. media from that point up to its victories in the 
2006 and 2007 elections. 
  As a result of U.S. hostility to HAMAS, the organi-
zation  increasingly  regards  the  U.S.  administration, 
although  not  the  American  people,  as  an  enemy. 
However, HAMAS is not interested in a global jihad 
like al-Qa’ida, and maintains that its only foe is Israel, 
hoping  that  better  communications  with  the  United 
States will emerge, and recognizing that its officials’ 
inability  to  travel  and  speak  with  Americans  have 
damaged its image.129
  The United States and Israel lobbied the EU to reject 
HAMAS. Under this pressure, the EU decided to reject 
the military wing of HAMAS, but not the organization 
as a whole; until 2003 and even later, certain European 
countries  maintained  ties  with  HAMAS.130  Overall, 
the  government-oriented  or  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Organization (NATO)-oriented security analysts have 
taken  a  hard  line  toward  HAMAS  and  seem  slow 
to  realize  that  backing  President  Abbas  is  a  losing 
course. 
Recommendations.
  1.  Let  HAMAS  fulfill  its  electoral  promise  to 
the  Palestinians.  The  International  Crisis  Group 
recommended in the summer of 2006 that HAMAS be 
allowed to govern and should cease hostilities against 
Israel.  Further,  the  boycott  should  end,131  as  it  has 
caused terrible hardship for Palestinians. 
  2. The truce planned for 6 months and embarked on 
June 19, 2008, could be extended through diplomatic 
efforts. HAMAS wants Israel to cease military strikes 
and incursions into Gaza. Israel requires rocket and 62
mortar fire from Gaza into towns like Sderot to cease.132 
HAMAS needs to show evidence of substantial positive 
movement towards sovereignty, prisoner releases or 
other concrete benefits of the truce to its population, so 
U.S. policymakers and DoD should strongly support 
the use of this period for negotiations, as international 
obligations  should  not  “be  undertaken  symbolically 
to  rally  support  for  an  idea  without  furthering  its 
attainment.”133 
  3. HAMAS did not capture Corporal Gilad Shalit 
but acquired custody of him. (This should alert the 
international  and  the  U.S.  defense  audience  to  the 
presence  of  far  less  controlled,  and  more  extreme 
entities than HAMAS who might well create chaos in 
its absence.) While HAMAS held out in late September 
2008 for a more significant prisoner exchange, it clearly 
aimed  to  redress  the  damage  to  its  capabilities  and 
the situation of a symbolically substantial number of 
prisoners. While some Americans have criticized the 
Israelis for negotiating for hostages, Yoram Schweitzer 
alludes to Israel’s counter-aim of proving to its citizens 
that it will not fail in efforts to rescue them134 given 
the military service needs of the state. Similarly, joint 
doctrine  holds  that  diplomatic  means,  including 
negotiations,  treaties  or  truces  are  possible  ways  to 
recover  personnel.135  HAMAS  position  is  that  the 
more than 11,000 Palestinian prisoners are, in essence, 
hostages. However, it must prevent its members and 
other groups from future hostage-taking. The increase 
in this tactic, like that of suicide attacks could forseeably 
continue. Hence U.S. policymakers or representatives 
acting in concert with Arab and European allies should 
do everything in their power to discourage the use of 
this tactic by Palestinians, and not only HAMAS, while 
convincing  Israelis  to  release  prisoners,  particularly 
those of the political category. 63
  4. Israel and the United States need to abandon their 
policies  of  non-negotiation  and  non-communication 
with  HAMAS.  A  new  American  President  should 
initiate a much more vigorous and dedicated program 
in  which  parties  will  agree  to  a  sustained  process 
which may take several years to complete, but which 
is  decidedly  preferable  to  the  enormous  social  and 
economic cost of militaristic group politics that have 
burdened the Middle East for 6 decades.
  5. U.S. policymakers and senior DoD leaders should 
heed certain lessons in the Palestinian-Israeli example 
as well as analytical failures of Israeli and Palestinian 
leadership.  It  is  wrong  to  summarily  replicate  the 
Israeli strategy of seizing territories and enclaves and 
defending perimeters in other contexts, namely Iraq. 
Such “clear and hold” policies may appear to work in 
the short term, but will never produce the true security 
needed for nation-building. Just so Israel has asserted 
its authority over, and oppressed a people whose will 
to resist could not be quelled, no matter what military, 
counterterrorist, or collaborator-buying actions were 
pursued, as their effort lacked legitimacy. 
  Chaim  Herzog  characterized  Israel  as  having  a 
“civilian army” with inspired leadership in its first two 
wars (David Ben Gurion, Moshe Dayan), which “out-
generaled” the Arabs, utilizing the indirect approach, 
improvisation  and  flexibility.  He  acknowledges  the 
IDF’s resulting overconfidence, and Egypt’s brilliant 
use of deception in the 1973 War. But Herzog completely 
underestimates the Palestinian people in his summary 
of the insubstantial threat posed by the PLO in this 
same work, The Arab-Israeli Wars,136 missing the very 
lesson that was oblivious to the French in Algeria, and 
which another Israeli leader, Ariel Sharon, vowed to 
get right. Characterizing popular resistance merely as 64
terrorism, or the “long war,”137 and facing it down with 
counterterrorist and barrier-based measures will not 
succeed in the long run. Locking up the Palestinians 
in their enclaves will only lead to another outburst of 
popular resistance, and has not protected the Israeli 
enclaves, just as no Green Zone, no cordon sanitaire can 
expect to be indefinitely secure.
  6.  Thus,  the  EU,  the  United  States,  Russia,  and 
the UN should aid the conflicting parties in devising 
a new approach138 to negotiations. This is important, 
for rather than standing shoulder-to-shoulder to the 
United States in postponing negotiations, the world’s 
diplomatic practice needs ample revision, so that the 
third Intifadha and the seventh Arab-Israeli War need 
never be fought. The benefits of abandoning silence, 
boycotts, and secret coups would extend beyond the 
Arab-Israeli conflict to the issue of nuclear weapons 
and Iran and other rapprochements necessary to win 
the war on terror. 
  7. Moderates on both sides must be strengthened, 
but not under the selective and factionalizing methods 
recommended  by  the  Quartet  and  Israel  to  date. 
Instead  of  just  one  specific  final-solution  oriented 
peace  process,  a  whole  variety  of  forums  must  be 
opened  between  Israelis  and  Palestinians,  including 
HAMAS,  with  direct  and  indirect  components  that 
tap into the existing or past dialogue functions held in 
neutral locations so that, when negotiations are well 
underway, peacemaking, state-building, and economic 
plans will also be actualized. 
  8. The parties could consider an internationalization 
of Jerusalem with specific reference to the holy places 
there.  The  Palestinian  and  Israeli  positions  are  far 
apart on the issue, but it is worth noting that in terms 
of international law, East Jerusalem was a part of the 
West Bank until its conquest and occupation in June 65
1967  under  the  Regulations  of  the  Fourth  Hague 
Convention  of  1907,  Articles  42  and  43;  the  Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 1 and 2 (which 
Israel ratified in 1951); the First Protocol of 1977, Part 
1;  and  UN  Resolutions  2253  and  2254  and  Security 
Council Resolution 252, which treats Israel’s unification 
of Jerusalem as an illegal act.139 This is the reason that 
other nations do not recognize Jerusalem as the capital 
of Israel and locate their embassies in Tel Aviv. 
  9. Jerusalem may be a more emotional issue than 
the  matter  of  Palestinian  refugees—except  to  the 
Palestinians,  their  refugees,  and  their  descendents. 
HAMAS’  position  is  that  they  must  be  considered 
and  offered  rights  of  return  because  those  are  the 
rights  possessed  by  all  Jews  in  the  world  today. 
HAMAS’ officials have added, as do others, that it is 
very likely that not many would return, and that a 
staged process granting a set number per year could 
be established, thereby alleviating certain other long-
standing situations in Lebanon and Syria, for example. 
A related solution is reparations for refugees, or both. 
These  issues  cannot  be  dealt  with  immediately,  but 
should not be put off as in the Oslo process, or ignored 
or denigrated by Israelis to the extent that Palestinians 
lose trust in the other side.
  10. Dismantling the settlements in the West Bank, 
and the corporate seizures and Israeli usage of land 
in the Jordan Valley which actually carves off a huge 
section of the West Bank, is essential to a resolution of 
the crisis. 
  11. The solution to the armed fighter presence in 
Palestinian  society  is  to  absorb  HAMAS  like  other 
groups  within  the  Palestinian  security  apparatus, 
but  that  rests  on  the  acquisition  of  a  national-unity 
government  healing  the  HAMAS-Fatah  rift  as  the 66
Saudi  government  had  attempted  in  Mecca  and  a 
successful settlement as discussed. The dissolution of 
the al-Aqsa Brigades in the West Bank shows this can 
be done, even though there were serious rifts between 
Fatah-proper and the Brigades. 67
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